THE BOMBAY COURIER.

PUBLISHED TWICE A WEEK,—EVERY SATURDAY AND TUESDAY MORNING.—PRICE 13 RUPEES PER QUARTER.

VOL. XLI.] TUESDAY, 22 OCTOBER, 1833. [NO. 2252.

NOTICE.

AT BYCULLA, adjoining the RACE-COURSE, and opposite the House of Correction, YATES AND CO. will sell by Public Auction, on the 28th instant, if not previously disposed of by private contract,

THE ROTUNDA BUNGALOW,

Containing 3 upper rooms, one 100 feet in circumference, the other two 25 by 18, with 2 rooms attached, one being a dining room, the other a godown and bathing room, with out-houses, together with a comfortable small bungalow for an office attached by a Verandah to the Coach-house. The whole of the ground about the bungalow is well drained,—a fine Shrubbery of fir trees, and a great quantity of beautiful plants of various descriptions; also—the household furniture and a large assortment of Europe Rabbits in hutches, English Pigs, a handsome white cow in calf, and several others, a Library containing (1,000) one thousand volumes of all descriptions of books, and a number of other useful articles.

The whole is now on view daily, from [illegible] M. until 5 P. M. Any particulars [illegible] be obtained on the spot by applying [illegible] Mr. J. NEWELL.

FOR sale at MESSRS. LECKIE AND COS. Godowns,

Bass' Pale Ale,.....at Rs. 45 per hhd.
Barclay's, do. .....at „ 35 „ do.
Ind and Smith's do. ..at „ 35 „ do.

Apply to SHAPOORJEE NASSERWANJEE.

FOR sale at the Godowns of Messrs. RITCHIE, STEUART, AND CO., Rankin's Pale Sherry in 6 dozen cases, at Rs. 15 per dozen.

Bombay, 22d October, 1833.

MESSMAN Wanted, for a Native Infantry Regiment.—Apply to WOOLER AND CO.

Bombay, 22d October, 1833.

FOR sale—A double Barrelled Percussion GUN, by Purdy, with apparatus complete.

Apply at the Office of Messrs. GILDER, AND CO., Apollo-street.

Bombay, 22d October, 1833.

TO BE LET,

A commodious and airy pleasant upper Roomed BUNGALOW, at Camballa, opposite to the Bee-Hive.—Apply to MOODY SORABJEE VATCHA GAUDY, at this Office, opposite to the Town Major's Office.

Bombay, 22d October, 1833.

FOR SALE at the Courier Office—A CODE OF SIGNALS, with a list of Vessels and their corresponding numbers in H. M. service, and the Commercial Navy of Great Britain, together with those belonging to the Port of Bombay. Price, one rupee.

FOR SALE—No. 12 of the QUARTERLY ARMY LIST. Price, rupees 3.

FOR SALE at the Courier Office—A few remaining copies of the BOMBAY CALENDAR and ALMANAC, printed on English Royal Paper for the present year, containing Rules, Regulations, and other matter of local interest not previously published.—Price 6 rupees per copy.

FOR Sale—Number XX of the ORIENTAL SPORTING MAGAZINE.

CONTENTS.—No. 1 The Married Hog-Hunter,—2 Reminiscences of the Fancy,—3 Song; "Fill the Goblet to the brim,"—4 The Florikan,—5 A Bison Hunt,—6 Another Wild Elephant on the Western Coast of India,—7 Captain Mundy,—8 Animals by their proper names,—9 Splendid Exploit of a Native Infantry Regiment,—10 Lines for the O. S. M.—11 Native Pharmacopeia,—12 Hunters of Yore,—13 A Song,—14 Hunting in the Southern Mahratta Country,—15 An Epistle from the Northern Concan,—16 Steeple Chases,—17 Performances of Chester,—18 The Hunting and Shooting Diversions of the Boondelas,—19 A Sagacious Horse,—20 The Union Coach,—Races to Come, and the Racing Calendar.

FOR SALE at the Courier Office,

The Oriental Sporting Magazine, from No. 7 to 19, each No.....	3 0 0
Blank Powers of Attorney,.....	0 2 0
Do. Interest Bonds,.....	0 2 0
Do. Policies,.....	1 0 0
Do. Bills of Lading, per set,....	0 2 0
Do. Respondentia Bonds,.....	0 2 0
Do. Bills of Exchange, per set,...	0 2 0
Plans of the Island,.....	1 0 0
Traveller's Itinerary,.....	5 0 0
Insolvent Debtor's Act,.....	3 0 0

LETTER-PRESS PRINTING, neatly executed upon moderate terms.

FOR FREIGHT OR PASSAGE TO LIVERPOOL,

THE fine fast sailing Ship ROYAL GEORGE, of 500 Tons, WILLIAM WILSON, Commander, daily expected, carries a Surgeon, and has excellent accommodations for Passengers, and will sail on the 15th December next.

Plans of the Cabins may be seen on application to Messrs. RITCHIE, STEUART, AND CO.

Bombay, 22d October, 1833.

FOR FREIGHT OR PASSAGE TO LONDON, TOUCHING ON THE MALABAR COAST FOR PASSENGERS, AND AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE,

THE fine new Ship EARL OF ELDON, of 600 Tons, EDWARD THEAKER, Commander. This vessel has a Poop and excellent accommodations for Passengers, and will sail positively on the 5th January 1834, for London, calling at the above places.

Plans of the Cabins may be seen on application to Captain THEAKER at the Office of Messrs. RITCHIE, STEUART, AND CO.

Bombay, 22d October, 1833.

FOR FREIGHT OR PASSAGE TO LONDON,

THE Ship LADY RAFFLES, ROBERT POLLOCK, Commander, Burthen 650 tons. Was to leave London about the middle of July, and will be dispatched in all January. This Ship has excellent accommodations, having double stern gallaries the same as an Indiaman, and carries a Surgeon. Apply to Messrs. ADAM, SKINNER, AND Co. at whose office plans of the cabins can be had.

Dady's Buildings, 22d October, 1833.

FOR FREIGHT AND PASSAGE TO LONDON,

THE Ship SIR EDWARD PAGET, W. TUCKER, Commander, late of the Lady Raffles, Burthen 500 tons. Will be dispatched in all December, carries a Surgeon, and has superior accommodation for Passengers. Apply to Capt. TUCKER, or Messrs. ADAM, SKINNER, AND CO. at whose Office plans of the Cabins can be had.

Dady's Buildings, 22d October, 1833.

FOR LONDON, TOUCHING AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE AND SAINT HELENA,

TO sail on the 15th of November, the fine teak Ship GILMORE. A. I. 550 Tons Register.

H. H. Lindsay, Commander. This Ship has Poop and lower deck accommodations fitted up in a superior style, and carries a Surgeon.

Plans of the Cabins may be seen on application at the Office of DUNCAN GIBB, AND CO.

Dady's Buildings, No. 4.

FOR FREIGHT OR PASSAGE TO LIVERPOOL,

THE fine British built Ship PARKFIELD,—MCAULAY, Commander, 500 Tons register. On her first voyage from England. This vessel has excellent accommodations for passengers, and is intended to be dispached early in December.—Apply to GISBORNE, MENZIES, AND CO.

AN ACCOUNT OF MAHOMED IBRAHIM MUCKBA'S SERVICES, AND THE REWARDS THEREOF.

Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba formerly for several years attended on many Gentlemen of the Presidency as Moonshee, to teach languages, for which he has the honour of possessing very high and creditable certificates, declaring his ability, intelligence, zeal, and assiduity, and some of them state, that he was the best teacher, being well acquainted with the Grammatical principles of the Native and English languages.

He was a Moonshee in the Cadet Establishment at Versovah from 1803 to 1808, which was afterwards abolished; and afterwards he was appointed Head Moonshee in the Cadet Establishment in Bombay from 1810 to 1813, for which he has an excellent certificate from the Superintendent of that Establishment.

He published Hindoostanee and Mahratta Grammars in 1823-25; the latter work was found particularly useful to the Gentlemen Students, and esteemed as a valuable book, so much so, that Government was kind enough to print the Grammars at their own expence, and to present him with the entire produce thereof; besides this, Government twice granted him some valuable *Khulaut*, as robe of honor for them, consisting of rich shawls, *kinkhabs* (or brocade) turbands, &c. The Mahratta Grammar is now out of print, and many applications have been made for it during the last two years.

Muckba's aid in the useful Goojerattee Grammar, by the late William Forbes, civil servant, is acknowledged as in the following note:—

TO MAHOMED IBRAHIM MUCKBA.

DEAR SIR.—I have the pleasure to send you a copy of my late Brother's work in the Goojerattee language, in the compilation of which, I know, he derived considerable assistance from you.

Your's truly,
(Signed) JAMES FORBES.

17*th October*, 1829.

In 1812 he was appointed as a Moonshee for the Persian and Goojerattee business in the Sudder Adawlut, till the Sudder was removed from Bombay to Surat in 1821. Regarding this and his other services, he has the honour of possessing some extracts from Government records; viz.

Ist.—Stating (among other things) that his uncommon industry and intelligence have been of the greatest advantage to the Court (of the Sudder Adawlut,) dated 18th January 1821. 2d—The Governor in Council also approves of the industry and intelligence evinced by Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba while he has been attached to the (said) Court, dated 1st February 1821. 3d—Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba's extensive knowledge of the languages of the East, and his well-known assiduity in the discharge of his public duty, will no doubt be held to entitle him to any consideration which Government can show to his case. Dated 18th September, 1831.

He was Moonshee to the Committee for the examination of the Civil Junior Gentlemen from 1822 which situation he held to the time of his retirement; no doubt to the satisfaction of the Committee.

The Government was pleased to comply with his request, by granting him an *Inam* of some land in the Kokan in 1831.

In 1815 he was appointed as a Native Interpreter, and in 1821 Assistant Persian and Arabic Translator to the Honorable the Recorder's,—now Supreme—Court, which he served up to 31st September 1833; and upon his intention of retiring from these situations he has the honor of obtaining certificates from the Officers of the Hon'ble the Supreme Court, the brief contents of which are as follow:—

1. I can with safety say, and have much pleasure and gratification in bearing testimony to the attention and assiduity of Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba to the duties of his situations. I can conscientiously recommend Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba to the favorable consideration of those of his superiors (if any such were necessary) in whose power it may be to promote his views or interest in any way, and conclude, by affirming, that I shall part with him with much regret, it being no easy matter to supply his place with a person of such varied talents and acquirements, conjoined to the most mild, conciliatory, and gentle disposition and deportment.

(Signed) JOHN VAUPELL.

20*th July*, 1833.

2. I have had constant opportunities of witnessing Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba's assiduity and attention to his duties, and I would particularly instance his intelligence in the arduous task of interpreting between the native witnesses and the Court, during the twelve years that I have held my present situation.

(Signed) ALEX. FERRIER.

4*th August*, 1833.

3. I have invariably found Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba most attentive and zealous in the performance of his difficult duties as Chief Native Interpreter, and in regard to which I can also bear testimony to former Judges having expressed their entire approbation, and as regards my office as Master in Equity in particular, when accounts in the native character, and of a complicated nature, have been referred to me by the Court, I have had many opportunities of witnessing his zeal and ability, and the assistance I have received from him in unravelling such accounts has been very satisfactory.

(Signed) WILLIAM FENWICK.

7*th August*, 1833.

4. I have great gratification in saying that for a period of upwards of nine years, I have uniformly found Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba most attentive, respectful, and obliging in all my dealings with him. His general character in Court is that of a man of the strictest integrity, and I have every reason to believe, that such character is deserved.

I may perhaps add, that I know the late Sir Edward West looked upon Muckba as a most respectable and upright man.

(Signed) MARTIN WEST.

12*th August*, 1833.

He had also the honour of receiving a complimentary letter in Persian and Goojeratee from his friends, some of the respectable Mahomedan, Parsee, and Hindoo inhabitants of Bombay; the close translation of the Persian one is as follows, and the contents of the Goojerattee is the same, but in its plain style:—

To the sincere and friendly MOONSHEE MAHOMED IBRAHIM MUCKBA, *may the benevolent God keep you safe.*

After offering the compliments of sincerity and reputation, let it be stated that, having heard your wish to be pensioned, and to retire from your situations of first Native Interpreter and Assistant Translator in Persian and Arabic, in the Hon'ble the Supreme Court, we, the undersigned Inhabitants of Bombay, think it necessary to announce hereby, our sincere opinion regarding you; namely, as long as you have been in the said situation of the Court, in hearing and seeing your conduct in performing the different duties of interpreting languages between the natives and the Court, and in translating Persian and Arabic documents for the Court, we, according to our best knowledge and experience, have always found you a most honest, upright, trust-worthy and humble person, and are very much pleased and satisfied with you, and for your retirement from so trust-worthy a situation, we are extremely sorry and sincerely regret it.

MAHOMED IBRAHIM,—We are also further obliged to your goodness and well wishing to the public in general, by frequently exerting yourself, and taking much trouble in endeavouring to prevent persons from much inconvenience and difficulty arising from trifling disputes, and by admonishing and giving checks to the abettors of such disputes, who expected to fill their own pockets by them. May the Gracious Almighty in his goodness reward you for all such acts, and keep you happy and prosperous in this world and also in the next, and may he make your successor equally fortunate, by endowing him with the same merits. Amen. Dated 14th August, 1833.

MAHOMEDANS.

Kazee Kootboodin, Sahib, the kazee of Bombay.
Pukee Mahomed Araee, the kazee of Suder Adawlut,
Mahomed Alee Rogay.
Shumsoodin Pulowkar
Aka Mahomed, Shoostree.
Hajee Mahamed Sueed Rogay

PARSEES.

Framjee Cowasjee,
Nowrojee Jamsetjee Vadia,
Bomanjee Hormasjee,
Cursetjee Ardaseer Dady,
Jemsetjee Jeejeebhoy,
Cursetjee Manuckjee, &c.

HINDOOS.

Mahdodass Runsordass,
Dackjee Dadajee, &c.
Dewidass Hurjevundass,
Jagunnath Sunkersett,
Motichund Amichund,
&c. &c.

On the 26th ultimo, The Honorable the Chief Justice on taking his seat, adverted publicly to the approaching retirement of Mahomed Ibrahim, passed a high encomium on his talents, zeal, and attention to his duty, and concluded by expressing his satisfaction, that Government had rewarded a long career of able and faithful service, by a liberal pension to the amount of his full salary, about 500 Rs. per mensem.

On the 1st of the present month, his successors were sworn in; Ardaseer Byramjee as Head Native Interpreter, and Shaik Hedayatoollah as Assistant Persian and Arabic translator.

On this occasion, The Honorable Sir Herbert Compton addressed Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba nearly in the following terms:—

"MAHOMED IBRAHIM:—You are now about to retire from the situation which you have held for so many years in this Court as Head Native Interpreter. I cannot permit you to retire, without expressing to you once more publicly, the high sense of the zeal, fidelity, and talent, with which you have performed the important duties entrusted to you. The Court will feel the loss of your services; but I must express the most sincere gratification at the liberality of Government, which will now enable you to pass the evening of your life, in all that comfort and respectability which your long services and character merit. May you long live to enjoy the reward the munificence of Government has conferred; and may others of your countrymen be incited by the honourable independence which you have attained, to tread the same honorable path which you have done!

MAHOMED replied as follows.

My lord,—I beg to express my humble and grateful thanks to your Lordship, the Court, and the Government, for their indulgent consideration towards me.

The learned and estimable linguist then bowed to the Court and retired with his friends.—*Gazette.*

MILITARY FUND.

TO MILITARY FUND SUBSCRIBERS.

MY DEAR SIRS,—To such of you as have not already returned your votes on the proposal now in circulation for reducing the pension of widows by encreasing the minimum of married subscribers (for that is literally the object of the proposition), allow me to offer the perusal of the following table:—It will show how 30 per cent. to your number are affected by the change; in a few years 50 per cent. may feel it, and, inasmuch as it is (I conceive), an attempt to correct an error of the fund by the application of a wrong principle, it will affect the whole subscribers to their disadvantage.

The table is meant to show what the widows of officers are to be in future entitled to, unless their husbands during their lives have the command of more money than is likely to be their lot.

No. of years as Ensign.		Do. as Lieutenant.		Do. as Captain.		Do. as Major		Do. as Lieut. Colonel.		Years of Furlough as Capts.	Total time of service.	Amount paid to the fund Rs.	Less than the minimum.	Pension of the Widow.		
Unmarried.	Married.	Unmarried.	Married.	Unmarried.	Married.	Unmarried.	Married.	Unmarried.	Married.							
6	0	8	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	22	3516	1464	£78	5	8
6	0	8	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	20	3035	1965	78	5	8	
2	0	8	0	7	0	0	2	0	0	3	22	3981	2519	93	9	10
8	0	7	0	0	2	5	0	1	4	27	5651	2349	105	16	8	
0	0	12	0	8	4	0	1	0	0	3	23	4117	883	93	9	10

No calculation is made either for an ensign marrying, nor for a young married officer dying; these occurrences do take place we know, but they would make the case appear harder to their widows if calculated, and may be easily imagined.

The table I think, shows,

1st*ly*. That an officer may serve 22 years paying up all his subscriptions required of him, and his widow shall not ever receive the reduced pension to which she is declared entitled by the 1st. Art. Sec. III. of the fund rules.

2d*ly*. That a Major and a Captain who have more than completed their time of service, and who have contributed 6,000 rupees and 4,800 respectively, shall only have entitled their widows to the respective pensions of £93,9,10 and £78, 5, 8.

3d*ly*. It shows that if an officer wishes to secure to his widow the full benefit of the fund at his death, he must pay up his minimun, and if he does so in early life, he shall, by the continued accumulation of his subscription have paid up much more than the value of his widow's pension when he has served his 22 years: interest must of course be calculated, and if at the rate allowed by Government, the sum will be very great as there is no maximum.—

The object of the proposition is without doubt to check early marriages and to lessen the burdens on the fund; both these effects may be required; but I would ask why not raise the subscriptions of married members rather, and give them some hopes of leaving their widows comfortable? And I would also ask, why is no credit given to subscribers for interest on their subscriptions as in other similar institutions? Does not the Government allow liberal interest on our contributions? and when the amount of those contributions becomes a question, why are we not credited with some interest on our amount?

I hope this view of the question, tho' written in haste, will be intelligible. I hope it will direct attention to the subject, and if it does, I have little doubts that many votes will be returned against the proposal, and I have some hopes that some returned already in its favor, may be amended.

A CAPTAIN OF 22 YEARS SERVICE.

Poonah, October 15*th*, 1833.

DEMAUN.

On the 3d. instant a solemn funeral ceremony was performed at the convent of St. Augustin, in Demaun, to the memory of the late General Pamplona, Count of Subserra, at which the Governor, the Senate, and a large number of the principal inhabitants of the settlement attended. The ship *Illustre Almeida*, had her colours hoisted half mast, and fired minute guns during the ceremony, which was concluded with a salute of 19 guns.

THE SEPOY LINES.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE COURIER.

SIR.—Although no official announcement of the intention of Government to remove one of the Native Regiments to the other end of the Esplanade has yet appeared, the rumour of such a measure is, I fear, too rife to permit the belief that it is not in contemplation.

While glancing at the subject in your last paper, you appear to have overlooked a forcible argument against this proceeding, which, fraught as it is with the most serious inconvenience to the community at large, has the additional objection of positive danger. The huge piles of cotton in the vicinity of the Apollo Gate, will, from the careless habits, and mixed character of the people attached to a cantonment, be constantly liable to the accident of fire, which in the Sepoy huts is, I believe, not unfrequent; but even a cheroot carelessly flung from it's smoker, might involve the destruction of property to an immense extent, and the mischief in all probability would not end there.

If, as is probable, Government have strong reasons for desiring to remove one of the Regiments from the enticing contiguity of the native town, they are not without an alternative for effecting their object, while they still spare us this lobe of the Fort lungs. Why not quarter the Artillery in the Town Barracks, and keep the King's Regiment permanently at Fort George, while one of the Native corps, or both, if desirable, might be sent to Colabah, thereby affording the best possible security for their future quietness? Half an hour would suffice to bring them thence, in the event of a call for their services, while the fatigue of marching to and from Garrison duty, and the expence and disadvantage of dividing the wings during the Monsoon would be spared the King's Regiment, always within the Fort, and convenient to its tour of duty.—I have heard from good authority that this arrangement is not only feasible, but most easy of execution; and I do hope, that it, or some other which shall ward off the nuisance and danger adverted to, and to which the public at large will be exposed, will engage the immediate and serious attention of Government, should any change in the present location of the troops have been under consideration.

I am, &c.
A MERCHANT.

Fort, October 21st. 1833.

STEAM NAVIGATION.

To G. ASHBURNER, Esq.
Secy. to the Steam Committee.

SIR.—The Subscribers to the Steam communication Fund at this station have *unanimously* requested me to intimate to the committee, through you, that they wish and intend, their subscriptions to be considered *Donations;* and in this intimation, I beg to add my cordial personal concurrence.

We are induced to take this public way of making the committee acquainted with our sentiments from having observed various letters and paragraphs in the Newspapers, regarding "joint stock companies" and "eventual profits," which we consider calculated to perplex the committee in its measures for carrying the great object in view into execution; and we shall be very happy if our humble example should induce other subscribers to come forward in the same manner.

I need hardly add, that you are at perfect liberty to make any use of this letter, which the committee may think proper.

I have, &c.
HENRY POTTINGER,
Lieut. Colonel.

Bhooj Residency, Oct. 2d. 1833.

SUBSCRIPTIONS.

Amount previously published.....	78,591 8 44
SURAT.	
Meer Ufzool ood deen Khan Qarmer ool Doula Husmut Jung, Bahadoor, Nuwab of Surat	200
W. J. Lumsden, Esq.....	100
Moolna Zenood deen, Chief Priest of Bohras	50
Ferozshah Dunjeeshah, Native Judge.....	100
Ardaseer Dunjeeshah, Baradoor, Principal Native Commissioner and Kotwal.....	100
Hafiz Daood Saleh Guner, Junior Native Commissioner.....	10
Suyed Goolam Hamed Nazir, of the Adawlut.....	10
Nurseedas Lukhmedas Nugursett.....	25
Rustomjee Hormuzjee Modee.....	25
Manuckjee Khoorshedjee, Assistant Apothecary.....	25
Moolna Qoodbood deen, son of Ubdool Futeh Merchant.....	25
Nakhoda Ubdool Rehman, do.....	25
Sadukbhaee Nurmewalla, do.....	25
Newneetraee Mooltanee.....	10

MILITARY ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES.

ARRIVALS.

Major M. Soppitt, 26th Regt. N. I. from Kulladghee.
Assist. Surg. C. Lush, Med. Est. from Dapooree.
Lieut. Bristow, 6th or 1st. Royal Warwickshire Regt. from Poonah.
Lieut. F. Farrant, 3d Cav. from do. do.
Capt. W. Burnett, European Regt. from do. do.

DEPARTURES.

Ensign J. Sinclair, 23d N. I. to Sattarah.
Capt. Dodgin, H. M. 20th Regt. to Belgaum.
Lieut. Barker, do. do. do.
Ensign Still, do do. do.
Capt. Watson, H. Artillery, to Deesa.
Capt. J. S. Jameson, 13th Regt. N. I. to Mahabuleshwar.

DOMESTIC OCCURRENCE.

DEATH.

At Belgaum, after a few days illness, on Sunday, the 29th of September, Ensign John Staunton Cahill, of the 3rd Regt. N. I.

His unassuming manners, gentlemanly deportment, and strict principle, gained him the esteem and affection of all his Brother Officers, by whom his loss is deeply regretted.

SHIPPING REPORT.

ARRIVALS,

Oct. 18th. Barque Comala, John Miller, Master, from Greenock, 29th May 1833.

21st. Barque Clairmont, A. Brown, Master, from Liverpool 30th May 1833.

Passengers.—Mrs. Brown, and one servant.

DEPARTURE,

Oct. 19. Ship Shahool Hamud, E. Dumontt Master, to Calcutta.

LIST OF SHIPPING IN THE HARBOUR.

HON'BLE COMPANY'S SLOOP OF WAR.—Ahnerst.
HON'BLE COMPANY'S STEAMER—Hugh Lindsay.
HON'BLE COMPANY'S BRIGS.—Nautilus, and Euphrates.
HON'BLE COMPANY'S SCHOONER—Shannon.
FREE TRADERS.—Boyne, Bounty Hall, London, Gilmore, Sir Edward Paget, Earl of Eldon, Francis, Grace, Comala, Clairmont, and Elora.
COUNTRY SHIPS.—Maria, Cyrene, Good Success, Cavendish Bentinck, and Ann.
PORTUGUESE.—Consoliel, and Amelia.
FRENCH.—Buffon.
AMERICAN.—Waverley.

THE COURIER.

TUESDAY, 22 OCTOBER, 1833.

We have much pleasure in noticing a handsome addition to the steam fund from the native inhabitants of Surat, a list of whose names will be found in a preceding column. We have also published a letter from Colonel Pottinger requesting, on behalf of himself and the subscribers to the steam fund at Bhooj, that their subscriptions may be considered as donations. This appears to have been occasioned by the insinuations which have been thrown out from time to time in various parts of the country regarding the Bombay joint stock scheme, as it has been called, and is perhaps the best way of refuting them. We have no doubt most of the other subscribers to the Bombay steam fund would readily follow the example which the residents at Bhooj have so liberally set, if it were necessary; but we must observe, it appears by no means so at present, and, in the event of certain contingencies, might prove rather awkward than otherwise.

A correspondent, in reference to the rumour which has prevailed regarding the removal of a native infantry regiment to the southern extremity of the esplanade, has called our attention to the danger which the heaps of cotton near the Apollo bunder would be exposed to from fire, were any measure of the kind resolved on. This did not strike us when we noticed the subject on Saturday last; but, that it would be very considerable cannot be doubted, both from the cause he assigns, and from the firing during parades which would then take place in the immediate neighbourhood of the cotton, and scatter thousands of small ignited particles in every direction. We are glad, however, to state it is by no means decided that the removal shall take place; and we have no doubt, when all the objections to it are fairly canvassed by the authorities, that the object for which it was intended will be sought after in some other direction.

So much has lately been published in various papers in this country regarding the possibility of an invasion of India by the Russians, that we were in doubt for some time whether to extract an article relating to it, which appears in the June number of the United Service Journal, or not. The merits of the paper, however, are such that, upon second thoughts, we have resolved, long as it is, to make use of it; and we cannot help thinking it will effectually set the question at rest to which it relates,—at least, while the science of War, and the dominions of the Czar, remain in their present state.

There is another respect, however, in which it must prove interesting to most of our readers; for it bears strong marks of being the production of our late Governor. These we think may be discovered, in the knowledge of India and Indian armies which it displays in various parts,—in the high terms in which the civil and military services of this country are alluded to, so contrary to the general tone of the United Service journal,—in the arguments also in favor of the Company's Government, which are precisely those Sir John Malcolm used, both in his writings and conversation; and lastly, in the initials J. M with which the article is concluded.

EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE.

THE "LATE" MINISTERS.

NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE—The mismanagement of time, during the present session, has been this—too much has been attempted to have had much done. It is not that ministers have not brought forward measures—it is because they have brought forward so many, that they have completed none. The characteristic of the time is, therefore, doubt. Throughout all the great interests there floats an anxious spirit of disquietude and uncertainty. No man knows what will be the fate of any of the measures hitherto introduced—we cannot track them to their bourne. The West Indian question of to-day may be very different from the West Indian question of to-morrow. The Bnak charter of next week will not perhaps, be the Bank charter of next month. The public attention, distracted with so many questions, sees all agitated and none settled—none, at least, of a remedial nature—and this is a great misfortune; those of a discouraging nature are, indeed, determined for the present. We are quite sure that the assessed taxes will not be taken off—we are not sure that tithes will not be kept on. This mismanagement of time has resulted from a want of bold and sagacious forethought in the government; they were not aware of the temper of the people at the commencement of Parliament. * * It is this want of foresight which has brought so many difficulties on the government. They need not have done half so much, but they might have done it with a greater effect. * * But, wanting this foresight and frankness of design—anxious to show the higher classes that they were not the democrats they were accused of being—desirous of putting a little into this scale, because they had just put a little into the other, they stop the gaping expectation of the people with the damp discouragement of the King's speech, and gallop away from the hopes of England upon the wings of a despotism for Ireland. * * Thus good measures have produced no satisfaction, and a general sentiment of disgust has swallowed up the merit of many individnal measures. The Irish church reform—the English Tithe Bill—the opening of the China trade—the well-meant, if donbtfully npractical, emancipation scheme of Mr. Stanley, have fallen like flakes of snow, melted in a moment, on the excited and acrid mind of the pub-lic. So much good may men do, and, for want of a greatness of design in the doing it, lose even the gratuity of thanks! * * One word on this unlucky national convention, and the verdict of the jury. Here, again, what bungling! Why not have taken possession of the place instead of beating people out of it? or why not have avoided all mistake and misinterpretation by at once reading the riot act? Because, scream the government newspapers, the law did not require the reading of the riot act. Dear gentlemen, that is no answer to the question. Did not the people believe the law did require the reading of the riot act? Do you not own that they did? Do they not still believe so, in spite of your assertions to the contrary? The duty of a benevolent and a wise government was to see that the people should not sin through ignorance, if it could be avoided; and, knowing the sad complication of our laws, they might at least have chosen a clear law when they had the option. Here, again, the want of foresight!—they disperse the national convention, a most trumpery and worthless enomy, and they bring down upon themselves the verdict of the jury that sat upon the poor policeman, and that is an enemy of public opinion. We are sorry for that verdict: it was evidently honest, but its ulterior consequences may be mischievous. A national convention is another word for national disorder: it can only be supposed to take place when all forms of regular legislation are suspended; and a verdict of "Justifiable Homicide" against a man who kills a policeman for assisting legally to disperse a mob with so ominous a name, is a justification of riot against law. And this the bungling and mismanagement of the Home Secretary have brought upon us. * * But the Bank charter and the slavery question are hurrying on—more first words, of which we are ne er to hear the last. Well, by the way, may the measures brought before our present Parliament be called questions, every body questions their merit, and nobody answers for their result!—*Atlas, June* 9.

THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH AND THE BISHOPS.

Passing events might almost induce the belief that the Prelates of the English Church stand more in dread of the whip of Mr. William Holmes, than the command of the divine author of the religion which they profess. If there is one law of Christianity more expressly laid down than another, it is that of doing unto others as we would be done by—of loving our neighbour as ourselves. But although a full number of Bishops was mustered to throw out the Local Jurisdiction Bill, which was, as they viewed it, a mere party question, yet when resolutions for the extinction of Colonial Slavery, the crying sin of the nation, were to be carried in the House of Lords, all the heads of the Church save two, thought it consistent with their duty to move off before the anticipated division. Even the organ of that Ministry which has truckled to the Bishops cannot resist a sneer at such conduct as this: we find in the *Globe* of Wednesday the following paragraph: —

"It was remarked in the House of Lords, that soon after Lord Ripon began to speak in favour of Negro Emancipation, all the Bishops save two went away. That the Reverend Bench are unanimous in their detestation of Negro slavery, as repugnant alike to the dictates of Christianity and to the feelings of humanity, cannot be doubted; and therefore the excuse of one of their friends is probably the truth—that having seen the inefficacy, or rather injurious tendency, of some of their late votes in Parliament, *they went home to pray for the cause in secret, rather than damage or endanger it by their public support.*"

They would fain uphold also the monstrous abuses of the Irish Sinecure Church. But the King cannot stand this and is determined therefore to exercise the authority which, as head of the Church, is vested in him, to prevent these half demented men from dealing another staggering blow upon the Protestant establishment. He has accordingly addressed a letter to them, whose recommendations, "patience perforce with wilful choler blending," they find it advisable to follow. The *Sun* states, that

"There have been two meetings of Bishops during the week. At one of them the King's letter was taken into consideration; and we understand that although it excited the ire of the Right Reverend Prelates, it is likely to *produce the inte nded result.*"

The union of the Church with the State has its bitters as well as sweets, then, after all. It is attempted, in an elaborate letter published in the *Standard* of Wednesday, to prove that the King's authority as head of the Church is of a very limited description; that there is "a higher than he; and that if he bids us do one thing and the King tells us to do another, we must go back to the old position of the Apostles," &c. So the et high Church and King men deny the authority of his Majesty to interfere in matters relating to the *temporalities* of the Church! Had an alteration in the Liturgy, instead of a reduction of the incomes of unemployed Bishops, been the point in question, we fancy that no such difficulty would have been raised, but that his Majesty's supreme authority would have been submissively recognized.—*Spectator, June* 27.

UNDER WHICH KING BEZONIAN?

WESTMINSTER REVIEW—The Whigs have done as little good as could be expected, and rather more of evil than could have been foreseen. As every man counts one, the question with many a man at this moment is whether he shall count it for the Whigs or for their rivals. It is quite true that our officers have done any thing but steer a course. They have set a sail forward, and backed another aft; and in every thing exhibited the imbecility of people who are as much afraid of the success of their own side as of the enemy's. This is all very bad; but is not there a worse? Is it not the fact, that we, the poor *negroes*, are all this time drifting down upon our coast of Guinea, and every day diminishes the chance, that though the other faction should get the lead, they will ever succeed in working off at all? Would it be politic to help to bring in the party, whose first operation, on feeling settled, would be, to put us all in irons below, and then carry sail like devils for Barbadoes? Would this mend our chance of escaping from the paws of the carcass-butchers in the end? It is matter to reflect upon. There is many an important interest at this moment driving before the wind in the right direction, that would be brought to anchor in a moment if the Tories were masters of the deck. It is true, that their time would come: and perhaps some frivolous gain might be made, of what they would give in the way of grog to the crew on their accession. But it will be time enough for this when it comes of itself. In the meanwhile Tory principles and expectations are falling to leeward, as fast as ever the Whigs cannot hinder. The Tories see clearly that their pear, instead of ripening, is growing more rotten daily. The Radicals, such as they are, had more need to try to get into some order for working the ship themselves than help to bring back the ancient breed of buccaneers.—*Atlas, June* 30.

ADMIRAL SARTORIUS AND SIR J. M. DOYLE.

A curious correspondence has taken place between Sir J. Doyle and Vice-Admiral Sartorius, a copy of which I beg leave to subj

CHALLENGE FROM SIR JOHN M. DOYLE TO V ADMIRAL SARTORIUS.

"The Aid-de-Camp of his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent, of Portugal, Major-General Sir John Milley Doyle, presents his compliments to his Excellency Vice-Admiral Sartorius; and having only this moment learned that the Vice-Admiral does not mean to honour with his presence the city of Oporto, intending forthwith to proceed to France, Sir J. M. Doyle has only this mode left of paying his respects to the Vice-Admiral. From the excited state in which Admiral Sartorius was during Sir John's sojourn at Vigo, perhaps his Excellency may not recollect the circumstances that passed on that occasion; indeed from the well-known politeness and gentlemanly habits of Admiral Sartorius, it is impossible he could recollect the mode, manner, and form, in which he treated Sir John Doyle on his reception during his sojourn as a close prisoner by his Excellency's illegal orders at Vigo. Sir J. M. Doyle feels confident that the moment the Vice-Admiral is reminded of that circumstance, his own gentlemanly feelings will dictate to his Excellency the absolute necessity of offering of his own accord those conciliations to the wounded feelings of Sir John (and which one gentleman is entitled to, and always sure of from another), for the personal insults and degrading treatment Sir John M. Doyle received, in his private as well as public capacity, from Vice-Admiral Sartorius on that occasion. Sir J. M. Doyle will be happy to hear of the perfect re-establishment of the health of Vice-Admiral Sartorius, and will be equally happy to assure his Excellency of his respect and consideration.—Oporto June 13.

"To Vice Admiral Sartorius."

(ANSWER.) "June 16, 1833.

"Vice-Admiral Sartorius informs Sir J. M. Doyle that his reception of Sir John at Vigo, when sent in execution of the Commission, which the Vice-Admiral has always felt as unjust, illegal, and impolitic, was such as he most certainly ought to have calculated upon, the *arrester* became the *arrested.* The Vice-Admiral leaves it to the private feelings of Sir John to decide whether it was delicate to charge himself gratuitously (or most certainly he could n ot be compelled to it) with so ungracious an affair, bearing on the liberty and honour of that same Captain Sartorius to whose exertion and visits in prison, seconded by the aid of the Consul-General, was mainly owing the liberation from the imprisonment *au secret,* and ultimate entire liberty of Sir John at Lisbon. If, however, any of the brother officers of the Vice-Admiral are of an opinion that the conduct was not entirely of a public nature, or that his language or manner was not such as was becoming a gentleman in the execution of a disagreeable public duty, the Vice-Admiral will be happy to meet Sir John, at any time and place he may appoint, upon their meeting abroad or at home."

SIR JOHN'S REPLY.

'Imperial Palace, Porto, 10 A.M., June 17, 1833.,

"SIR.—Having addressed you a note, dated the 13th instant, to which I have this moment been honoured with a reply, it now becomes an imperative but painful duty in my part to request your Excellency will do me the favour to conceive that you have been horsewhipped by Sir J. M. Doyle, K. C. B. and K. T. S., who laments that your unaccountable and unwarrantable conduct should oblige him to adopt this as the only step your intended flight from the scene of your gallant exploits has left open. But should your Excellency, on more mature reflection, revoke your intention of proceeding forthwith to France, I shall be most happy to receive you at the Foz whenever you are pleased to appoint, and to assure your Excellency that every attention and requisite accommodation will be provided for you during the short period that your residence may be necessary on that occasion in Portugal. The undersigned regrets your extraordinary mode of acting precludes him from the possibility of having the honour of subscribing himself, with consideration and respect,

"Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

"J. M. DOYLE, Major-General, A. D. C.

"To his Excellency Vice-Admiral Sar

Sir John Doyle declares Captain Sarto interference in his behalf at Lisbon to have

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by the direction of the Earl of Aberdeen, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs.—*Morning Chronicle, July* 15.

HUMBUG OF THE BAR IN ENGLAND.

(From Tait's Magazine.)

AN honest lawyer is one of those hazardous miracles that would damn a play; under unfortunate circumstances, "my rascally attorney," is as indispensable a phrase as "my impertinent tailor;" but whoever heard of my blackguard of a barrister? Who disputes the honour of the bar? Surely Mr. Serjeant Such-a-one is an honourable man!

"So are they all—all honourable men."

But the bar holds itself out, not only as an honourable, but as a liberal and learned profession. Let us investigate its title to these three characteristics, first, putting it as a proposition that honour opposed to honesty, becomes disgrace; learning applied to the subversion of truth, worse than ignorance, and liberality at the expense of justice, knavery.

The advocates of ancient Rome were not mere hirelings—to them the term *client* meant something more than a customer, or a customer's deputy. The counsel of our own day, too, boast of their professional inability to demand or sue for fees; but how seldom do we hear of one receiving a brief *without a fee*, or pleading a cause gratuitously? It is against their very rules to do so. A barrister may, for a guinea or two, prostitute his skill to the support of an unjust action, and remain an honourable member of the bar; but let him seek gratuitous advocacy in the defence of the oppressed or the indigent, and he will be immediately cut by his "learned friends" at Westminster, circuit, and sessions, for *huggery* (that is their term) and disreputable practice. In fine, whilst, the high-souled barrister shrinks with theoretical horror from every thing approaching to solicitation of a fee, he clutches it with the rapacity of a pongo—*pouches* it with the rapidity of a monkey, and retains it with the tenacity of a bull-dog. "No money returned," say the play-bills—no money returned, cries the barrister—"*dum vivimus vivamus.*"

But let us descend into detail—what qualifications are necessary for the bar, and the conduct of its members, with reference to each other, the court, and the client or attorney?—The recommendation of two barristers, thirty pounds, and a bond for the payment of accruing dues, will procure the student's admission to any Inn of Court. Here he must remain five, but if a member of an English or Irish University, only three years before he can be *called*, and, in either case, nine exercises and twelve terms must be kept,—the non-university student being obliged previously to deposit 100*l.*, to which he has to add a few more before he can assume the wig and gown. The exercises are a mere farce, being put into the student's hands ready written, and to which he receives a nod of approbation before he can pronounce the second word. Keeping terms is only another phrase for eating dinners,—a certain number of which constitute a term. In the mean time, the student is supposed to have passed some time under a special pleader, or equity draughtsman; but, for aught the benchers of the Inn know to the contrary, they may call to the bar a man who never opened a law book, nor entered a court! Such are the preliminaries which entitle an individual to the appellation of "my learned friend."

The courtesy which exists among the members of the bar is at the expense of their clients. A prisoner unjustly arrested cannot have the rule made absolute for his discharge on Monday, because it is inconvenient for the opposing counsel to argue the point until to-morrow—perhaps Wednesday or Thursday. "You must be aware," says the prisoner's advocate to the attorney, "that I am perfectly ready, and, in fact, there can be no doubt about the point, but my learned friend has put it to me as a matter of personal obligation to himself, to delay the motion, and says he has not looked at his brief."

But to come into court upon a more important occasion; let the reader fancy himself the plaintiff in a cause about to be brought on. Previously to the trial, a consultation is in all probability deemed necessary, which, as the court sits at half past nine, is appointed prior to that time in the robing-room or the coffee-house, where *the leader* breakfasts. The parties accordingly assemble at the appointed hour, and the leader's clerk acquaints his master with the name of the case in which he is about to appear. "Oh! exactly, 'Snibbs against Somebody.' well—what's the point; I believe I'm for the plaintiff?" The junior takes up his cue, and relates the particulars of the case with a verbosity which shows that *he* has had time enough to read his brief. "Ah! it all lies in a nut-shell"—interrupts the learned leader—"but still, if it could be settled without going into court—a reference, perhaps—your client objects, I see,—well then, he must take the consequences—we shall have the judge against us."—"But, Sir," says the trembling client, "if my witness prove my case, surely—" "Don't interrupt me, Sir; we can't waste time in idle speculations; I've two more consultations before the Court sits, Gentlemen, good morning."

The poor suitor's case is at length called on—the opening speech made—the witnesses examined—assault proved—verdict given for the plaintiff—damages 40*s.*—the counsel, with a facetious chuckle, congratulates the attorney upon his luck, and looks at his next brief.

Now, what is the result of all this?—the client is awarded 40*s.*, and all *his costs in the cause* are to be paid by his opponent; but then comes the extra costs, "*as between Attorney and Client*," which the successful party has to discharge himself; and thus, after having received a sound thrashing, for which the action is brought, and endured many months of uneasiness, he finds himself minus at least, notwithstanding his damages, of some six or eight pounds ten!—a great deal more or a trifle less, as it may happen.

Such is the mode in which cases are too frequently conducted; the advocate, who has, probably, never looked into his brief until the moment when he should be thoroughly acquainted with its contents, under the pretence that, in attempting to prove all, he may prove too much, rejects the most important part of the plaintiff's testimony, and calls just sufficient to establish a mere legal claim to a verdict, reckless alike of the feelings and the interest of his client, both of which are, in some measure, in actions like the above, committed to his discretion.

The mode in which counsel conduct the examination of a witness is too well known to need exposure; the pompous trickery of "Upon your oath, sir," and "Will you take upon yourself to swear?" to intimidate a man from the truth rather than lead him into it, is equally resorted to by the brow-beating bully, and the tortuous sophist. Should the Judge misdirect the jury either as to the law or fact, interference is rarely attempted; the senior counsel has left the court for refreshment: he is reading the newspaper, preparing for the next case, and the junior does not sufficiently *possess the ear of the court* to venture upon an interruption:—"You have your remedy," is the answer: "move for a new trial."

Another grievous abuse is the changing of briefs; so that if I give my case to Mr. *Voluble*, it probably falls into the hands of Mr. *Stutter*, the former having some other engagement more pressing than the interest of his client. It is in vain for me to exclaim to my attorney, "It was my wish that Mr. Voluble should be employed. I find in your bill of cost, 'Retainer to Mr. Voluble and clerk, 1*l.* 3*s.* 6*d.* Fee to Mr. Voluble and clerk with brief, 10*l.* 10*s.* Refresher to Mr. Voluble and clerk, 1*l.* 3*s.* 6*d.*' Stutter is an ass; I wouldn't have given him six-pence." But the fact is, Stutter does not get sixpence; the courtesy and liberality—the honour and independence of the bar alike forbid it. But then, surely, then, the honour and independence of the bar does not hinder Mr. Voluble from returning the fees to his poor client, who has, perhaps, lost his cause through his absence! No such thing—*custom* forbids it.

The practice at chambers is not less involved in mystery and chicanery; the opinion of an eminent counsel upon the most trifling point is not to be obtained, sometimes, under many months. Day after day the attorney sends for the expensive desideratum. "Really, Mr. Serjeant So-and-so is very sorry, but he has not had time; or, Mr. Serjeant So-and-so's clerk looks pompously over his list of cases (perhaps three or four), and discovers that there are several yet before the one required, and "it cannot be taken out of its order." To heighten the joke—for joke it is to all but the client—the opinion could, in all probability, be given just as correctly, and much more speedily by the attorney; but being liable by law for the consequences of his judgement—which a barrister *the only person deemed legally competent to give an opinion, is not*—the former, in his own defence, shifts the responsibility from himself to nobody.

So much for the learning, liberality, and honour of the bar, from whose members are chosen the men that are to pass judgement upon our lives, our rights, and our property. Let us no more hear the epithet "honourable" applied to a profession, the followers of which professing every thing that is noble and independent, torture right into wrong, and wrong into right, and who, under the influence of motives the most sordid and narrow, attain ends the most unjust and oppressive by means the most base and despicable. For heaven's sake, let the mockery attendant upon such a profession cease; let the hire of the barristers be fixed like that of any other trade (if its parallel for plunder can be found), and give them the right to sue for that without which they will not, and, by a rule of their own, dare not work. In return for this, let them be sued by their employers if they neglect their duty; let those who hold the brief receive the fee; we shall then have no absentees; the fear of losing his guinea or two will insure the advocate's punctuality more effectually than that of losing the cause of his heart-broken client.

ON THE OVERLAND INVASION OF INDIA.

"We shall negotiate with the English at Bombay"—*Petersburg Gazette.*

An opinion has been gaining ground, for the last half century, that, in the event of a rupture between Great Britain and Russia, an attempt might be made by the latter power against our Indian possessions. It was not the interest of the cabinet of St. Petersburg to allay our ill-concealed fears on this subject: on the contrary, that ambitious and Machiavelian government always made the most of our apprehensions, and took even some pains to ascertain the nature of the countries intervening between the Indus and the Russian frontier; so that as many plans for the over-land invasion of India are said to be deposited in the archives of the war-department at Petersburg as at Paris. It is useless to enter into any detailed account of these schemes as far as they are known, they serve but to illustrate an important moral truth, showing, that, in exact opposition to the conception of great and noble undertakings, which raise the genius of the projector to the level of their execution, the "base lure of gain" (and all these plans of Indian conquest originate only in a low desire for plunder) tends only to narrow and contract the judement in the same proportion that it inflames the imagination. Lieut.-Col. De Lacy Evans, an officer of great talents & experience, was the first, so far as is known to the writer of this article, to call attention to the possibility of carrying an army up the line of country traversed, rather than watered, by the Oxus. This long, low, and narrow stripe of *steppe* land, considered already in the time of Herodotus as the usual gate through which the Asiatic tribes invaded Europe, is described by Ritter, in the second volume of his great geographical work just published*, "as almost totally destitute of wood, verdure, or productive earth; the soil everywhere impregnated with salt, covered with drift-sand, and bearing little besides the spare and thorny shrubs of the desert." Notwithstanding the difficulties that the passage through such a country would naturally present to the advance of an army, Colonel Evans's idea is still the only one, yet advanced on the subject, that seems at all deserving of serious attention; and how far even his opinion may stand the test of professional investigation remains to be seen. If, passing over half, the obstacles that an army following the route pointed out by Col. Evans would be certain to encounter, we shall still succeed in showing the impracticability of such an enterprise, we may of course be excused from investigating any of the either plans, hitherto suggested, for driving the "dominators of the sea" out of India, as the execution of the best of those, that are not absolutely ridiculous, offers incomparably greater difficulties than the one against the possible adoption of which by our enemies the gallant Colonel has so ably warned us. The reader will not expect that we should seriously enter the lists against the projectors, who deliberately embark entire French armies on the sea of Suez, where there are neither ships nor materials for building them; or that we should stop to refute the imaginative tacticians who, in three sentences, canter fifty thousand warriors of the great nation across the deserts of Syria and of Persia, to the very gates of Calcutta.

In an inquiry of this nature we must reason principally from analogy, because, owing to our imperfect knowledge of central Asia, we can form but imperfect notions of the difficulties that might be encountered by modern European armies in marching through such barbarous regions; and, as to any aid or reinforcements by the way, we cannot possibly comprehend from whence they are to be derived.

And now to the more direct parts of our subject.

Considering the difficulty experienced at Lisbon by Sir John Moore, in merely equipping some twenty thousand British troops for a march into Spain, the complicated operation proposed by Lieut.-Col. Evans, of bringing a Russian army down the Wolga, transporting it across the Caspian, landing it in the Bay of Balkan, marching it by Kiava to the Oxus, embarking it on that river, and then ascending to Bokhara, seems certainly no easy undertaking. Yet, as it cannot be called impracticable, let us suppose it achieved, notwithstanding the jealousy of the natives, and the obstacles, short of actual hostility, they would not fail to throw in the way of its execution. And having made this liberal concession in favour of the first campaign, let us further suppose a Russian army of adequate strength (whatever that may be), after wintering at Bokhara, started for the invasion of Indian at the best season of the year with all its necessary supplies and *materiél*, and let us then judge, from former events, what would probably be its fate.

Napoleon started from the banks of the Oder in May, 1812, for the invasion of Russia, with about 550,000 men. The main body of this army, under his own immediate command, consisted, at the commencement of the campaign, of 295,000. On the 7th September it brought only 120,000 into the field of Borodino, and, allowing 30,000 to have fallen in the previous engagements, and this is much above the mark assigned by any of the historians, what became of the 145,000 still left unaccounted for? † Any one acquainted with war can easily answer the question,—they fell to the rear, or perished from want, misery and fatigue. The distance this army had to traverse was in a straight line, less than 500 miles, for many of the French corps were not only in advance of the Oder, but beyond the Vistula. They started from the most fertile countries in Europe, from the midst of their depots, from cantonments where they had been stationed for years, and making preparations for months; their march lay through peopled, civilised, and cultivated countries, and was performed in the finest season of the year, and yet they could not after such a four months' march, bring one half of those into battle who had escaped the sword. We have started the distance from the Oder to Moscow, in a straight line at 500 miles, and in military calculations we add a quarter to the straight line of distance to make up for the windings of the road which, together with the *détour* made by the French army round Smolensk, will give a distance of about 700 miles actually marched over. If then a march of 700 miles along fine road, and level ground (for the country between the Order and Moscow is almost a perfect flat,) commenced under all the advantages above enumerated, was attended with privations and fatigue to occasion a loss so tremendous, what is likely to be the fate of an army having double the distance to go before entering fairly on the scene of action, and under circumstances of far greater difficulty and hardship?

The expedition of Hannibal furnishes another example of a similar loss: that great commander took five months to march with his unincumbered ancient army (for he left his heavy baggage behind under the care of Hanno) from New Carthage to the banks of the Po, a distance of 68[illegible]0 *Roman* stadia, or about 850 of their miles. With the precaution that might have been expected from such a leader, he had caused all the countries between the Pyrenees and the Alps to be carefully reconnoitred beforehand, and had entered into treaties with the intervening Gallic tribes for the supplies that his army might require; yet, notwithstanding these judicious arrangements, he lost two-thirds of his men by the way, though the march was performed in the best season of the year, and free from all opposition, except what was experienced in the Alps, which, having only plunder for its object, was neither very systematic nor determined.

Let not the *amateur* pedestrian, who journeys pleasantly from one *albergo* or *pasada* to another, be surprised at such losses. A march, however fatiguing, that is sure to close at last with a good supper and a warm bed, and a march from one wet and cheerless bivouac to another, are altogether different things. With regular food, rest and shelter, a man may do a great deal; yet even with these he requires, after long continued exertion, some respite from toil in order to recruit his exhausted strength. But, in all marches extending into uncultivated countries, beyond the reach of depôts, food, both in quantity and quality, becomes precarious, while rest depends entirely on the clemency of the weather; and every day of want and night of rain lessens, though imperceptibly at first, the soldier's strength, so that, in the end, a blistered foot from accident or bad shoes, a slight attack of dysentery from uncertain diet, or only a week's exposure to rain, will oblige a man to fall to the rear. And in a long continuous march, like that to Moscow, or the one now in question, all such men must either delay the whole army, or they are lost; for where the cause of the evil is constant, it cannot be expected that rest, and the means of healing the foot or curing the dysentery, (if even within reach,) should enable the convalescent, not only to make up his lee-way, but to go through what he was unequal to before his illness or accident. The young and the weak are of course the first to give in; but, as want and fatigues augment, as time flies and hopes decay, the ranks thin in proportion, till at last a few nights of rain and days of deep and cheerless road, or unrefreshed toil and exposure under the scorching rays of a vertical sun, bring down entire sections, and exhibit, in the rear of the line of march, scenes of suffering that few who have not witnessed can well picture to themselves, and from which death offers, too frequently, the only, and, in such situations, not always the most unwelcome relief. The strong of limb, the high of heart, and above all the soldiers bronzed in many a field, and nerved to toil by many a march, will long indeed bear up against every hardship; but "prolonged endurance tames the bold;" and where is the strength that for the best part of a year shall support toil, precarious subsistence, and constant exposure to all weathers, from the frozen snows of the Hindoo-Kho to the boiling exhalations of the Punjab? In ordinary campaigns, carried on at no great distance from the frontiers, the very operations occasion halts and delays that enable convalescents and stragglers to find their way back to the army with the convoy and detachments that are constantly advancing to its aid; but, in crossing the *steppes* of Central Asia, these advantages fall away, and moreover, a musket and sixty rounds of ammunition are there treasures not likely to be left in the hands of an invalid.

The distance from Bokhara to Attock on the Indus is, in a straight line drawn on Rennell's Map, 630 miles; and from Attock to Delhi in Northern India, (and an army must at least enter the country it intends to invade,) 440 more, making 1070 miles; that, in the same proportion at which the march of Napoleon was before estimated, should give at least thirteen or fourteen hundred miles of march, or double the distance that cost the armies of Hannibal and Napoleon nearly two-thirds of their numbers, the line of march being besides intersected by the Hindoo-Kho mountains, the formidable barrier of the Indus, and the five rivers of the Punjab, the former superior, and the latter all equal to European streams of magnitude.

Colonel Evans says, that to arrive at Attock, the first point of probable collision between the invaders and defenders of India, both parties would have to perform a march of nearly equal length; but he forgets that a march through our own, or subject territory, where every preparation may precede the troops, and every aid close in upon them as they advance, and a march through strange, not to say hostile countries, where no preparation can be depended on, and where no aid will close in, can not possibly be measured by the same scale. It is like sailing the same distance with a fair or a contrary wind.

Of the Hindoo-Kho Major Rennell says, that it "swells to a great height and bulk, and is covered with snow till the month of August." And Ritter, in the introduction to the first and only volume of his Geography of Asia yet published, describes it as forming the connecting link between the eastern and western division of the great mountain mass that stretches from the coast of the Corean Sea to the Euxine. The Hindoo-Kho, he says is not a single mountain-chain, like the Andes, but an entire system of such chains, rising to the greatest elevation, and forming, in its unconquered loneliness, the almost unknown and untravelled mountain centre of the entire continent. From Arrian we also know that it took Alexander's army fifteen days of great suffering, owing to the deep snow, and the total want of all necessaries, to cross the northern ridge alone; and Q. Curtius tells us, that the whole country is so constantly covered with frozen snow, that no traces of birds or beasts are to be found in it. *Monsieur de St. Croix* amply establishes the veracity of the ancient historians, by the corroborating testimony of Bernier, Forster, Shereffedin, Backoy, and the Jesuit missionary Desideri, which last, after speaking of the dreadful cold he experienced in the regions, says, "*ces montagnes sont une vraie image de la tristesse. de l'horreur et de la mort même.*" What may be the extent or height of these mountains has never, we believe, been ascertained; but as we know that their tops are constantly covered with snow, and as the lowest line of perpetual snow on the northern ridge of the Himalaya, of which they form but a continuation, is 17,000 feet above the level of the sea, and as the base and ramification of all mountains, except in mere volcanic formations, is in exact proportion to their height, we may easily conceive what an extent of mountain wilderness they must present, and what a formidable obstacle they would oppose to the progress of a heavily encumbered European army. Major Dirom in his Account of the Campaign of 1761, says, that "after the road over the Ghaut had been finished, it took three weeks of hard labour to bring the battering-train, consisting of only fourteen 18-pounders, with their stores and tumbrils, to the top of the hill." Yet the Ghaut is but a single range, the highest part of which is nowhere 5000 feet above the level of the sea, or less than one-third of the known height of the Hindoo-Kho.

Making every allowance for the beauty and fertility of Caubul, a sort of gigantic Switzerland according to Major Rennell, being "made up of mountains covered with perpetual snow, hills of moderate height, rich plains, stately forests," &c., the country nearer the Indus is evidently of a very rugged nature; for, independent of the many difficult streams Alexander's army had to pass, and such rocks as Aornas, and others mentioned by the historians, he was obliged to cause roads to be levelled even for the march of his Macedonian army, though that army was perfectly unencumbered with baggage, the king having ordered the whole to be burnt previous to the Indian expedition. What figure a European army would make in such a country we shall see presently.

Colonel Snodgrass, in his History of the Burmese War, says, that "the army generally covered about five miles of road in its march up the Irawady, and that the head of the column had often arrived at its halting place before the rear started." Now, if an army, never exceeding 5000 men, marching through a level, though not an open country, and whose stores were all conveyed by water, lengthened out to five miles, to what distance might an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men, encumbered with all its

* Erdkunde von Asien. Berlin, 1832.

† The second edition of the Marquis De Chambery's Philosophie de Guerre, states the total number of the grand army that actually entered Russia, at 613,000, so that we have 63,000 to the good.

artillery, and with at least 150,000 * beasts of burden, lengthen out, in winding through the trackless defiles of the rugged and difficult country leading down towards the Indus? If we say only fifty or sixty miles, which is making no allowance for stores, does not the very idea of such an enterprise at once become almost ridiculous? for parallel columns are out of the question, where one practicable path will be difficult to find. What is this scattered mass, "dragging its slow length along," to do, if attacked in rear by a few light infantry only?—the head of the column is five or six days in advance, and the rest in proportion. Wherever a halt is made, it leaves an opening never likely to be regained; the advance may be overthrown before it can be supported, and the flanks are of course perfectly defenceless. Let any one fancy such a mass winding along the side of a difficult torrent or ravine, or beneath some high wall of granite, where a few hundreds or dozens only of marksmen have contrived to shelter themselves, and fancy the confusion occasioned by the firing, the distress of the wounded, floundering and plunging of horses, and the upsetting of guns, and the the same scene acted perhaps at the same time in five or six points of the line of march,—night setting in, and the right track lost. Alexander, it may be said, easily overcame those who attempted to impede his march, but he was never systematically opposed; and besides, modern arms are for this sort of warfare, and for this only, far superior to those of the ancients. Entire battalions may be brought down by the musket and rifle from across torrents and precipices, at a distance at which the ancients could only be quiet spectators of the movements of their enemies. To secure or clear the flank of every difficult pass, on such a line of march, would of itself require an army and delay the march *ad infinitum*,—while to divide the army into a succession of columns, would only augment the number of weak points, without in the least diminishing the evil. In such an expedition the first principles of military basis, so ably explained by Bulow, must be entirely set a side; yet have they never been deviated from with impunity when resistance was made. Napoleon lost his army at Moscow for disregarding them; and Diebitsch forfeited at Warsaw the false and short-lived fame he had acquired by slighting them at Adrianople. An European army arriving after such a march in the countries leading down to the Indus, finding itself attacked in front, flank, and rear by bodies of light troops skilfully commanded, always giving way, but constantly returning, and finding the passage of the river securely guarded, should, were duty done on every hand, have no alternative left but to lay down their arms. Napoleon said to his army before the battle of Borodino, "*La bataille vous est nécessaire*,"—meaning, the quarters of refreshment a victory would secure were indispensable in their situation. And it was truly said; for, let any one suppose this army, instead of finding rest and refreshment at Moscow, obliged to march two hundred miles farther though a rugged country, mostly laid waste, and arriving at last, not in good quarters, but on the banks of a river like the Indus! How, in fact, is a steam of such magnitude to be passed in the face of a vigilant enemy? It must not be considered as an operation easily performed, because, in European warfare, such enterprises have generally proved successful. It is here to be performed after a thousand miles of march over barely passable roads,—want and toil having most certainly attended every step; it must be achieved in the face of a practised enemy, who, from the nature of the country, the scarcity of a direct, and the total absence of diverging roads, will know the very spot where invaders must reach the river. The Indus, twenty miles above Atock, where Forster crossed it, is already deep, rapid, and "three-quarters of a mile in breadth;" and Frazer says, that "owing to the depth and rapidity of the stream, and to the rugged nature of its banks, it is only passable for an army at Atock," the ancient Taxila. How, under such circumstances, we again ask, is this river, which cannot be turned, to be passed? In European warfare, the passage of rivers is effected by arriving unexpectedly at some unguarded point; stealing a march for that purpose, to the right or left, or driving the defenders from the opposite bank by a superiority of fire, and then crossing by means of pontoons or such materials as the country may afford. We have already seen, that to arrive unexpectedly at an unguarded point of the Indus is out of the question: to steal a march through an Indian jungle is difficult, through an Indian forest impossible; and would besides lead only to points all equally destitute of the means of effecting a passage: for, whoever has seen a pontoon-train floundering along a well Macadamized road in Europe will hardly expect to see such an exhibition on the Indus. Rafts may, no doubt, be constructed on some of the minor rivers and floated into the main stream; but, as no fire of artillery can afford them protection across a river of such breadth, and as they are not very manageable in a strong current, they will form, at the best a precarious navigation. But whatever contrivance may be devised, it will require time; and to give the non-military reader an idea of the value of time to a suffering and exhausted army is totally impossible; for there is no standard of sufficient magnitude by which it can be estimated. Gold and jewels are but dross in comparison.—and fast as it always flies, fast as it may fly in love and beauty's bower, it flies even there with leaden wings compared to the lighting-speed with which it leaves an army that must pay with its ebbing particles of life for every hour's delay, and on which the loss of a day may bring ruin and destruction. Had Antioch held out a few day longer, the 50,000 survivors of the million of crusaders that entered Asia with Godfrey of Bouillon must have perished; and the army of Barbarossa was only saved from dying of thirst, hunger, and fatigue, by the capture of Iconium: had that place been defended for a single day, or been a single march farther off, it never would have been captured by the exhausted remains of an army led by the greatest man of the period.

As the passage of the Indus will have been good practice for effecting the passage of the five rivers of the Punjab, we shall suppose them all crossed, and the invading army arrived in the level country to the north of Delhi, which Major Rennell represents as the battleground where, in all ages, the fate of India has been decided. But before proceeding any farther we must first stop to enquire how long the invaders may have been in performing the march from Bokhara, and how they contrived to find provisions by the way.

If the French required from May to September to march over seven hundred miles of level road, (for the Russians never attempted to impede their advance, except at Smolensko and Borodino, Bonaparte's great difficulty being always to overtake his flying enemies,) what time must an army require to march double the distance, under the additional difficulties already mentioned? And besides having to make a great part of the road for the conveyance of its artillery! If we say only double the time, (and how much more might we not say?) then winter is even colder than in Russia; and in the lower grounds the rains prevail to an extent, that the following extract from the Subaltern's Log-Book will best show:—

"The rain continued so incessantly, that we made no progress; never did I witness heavier rain, with stronger wind: trees were torn up by the roots in every direction; the rivers were so swoln that we were constantly obliged to halt to wait until they went down. On the 24th October the rains became so heavy, that we could not proceed, and were obliged to halt in a swamp close to a jungle. Our tents were far in the rear, and none of our baggage had come up: during that dreadful day, it was with difficulty we could sit on our horses. We remained in this state for three days,—and I scarcely know how our lives were preserved,—fevers and other diseases were contracted, which carried off many. On our getting to the regiment, I heard that one hundred men went to on early grave, owing to what they suffered on this dreadful occasion."

If a single battalion, marching from one quiet cantonment to another, with every Indian comfort to help and recruit them, suffered so severely, what might, from similar causes, be the loss of an army cut off from all comforts, engaged in a long and toilsome march, and on the point of encountering the enemy? Segur says, that the grand army lost 10,000 horses, besides men and baggage, in consequence of a storm that happened on the very day they crossed the Niemen. In the first French invasion of Portugal, the whole of Junot's army was dispersed by a two days' storm, near Abrantes; and we know that Charles V. was obliged to raise the siege of Algiers, owing to what his army suffered from a similar cause. The generous and magnanimous motives, free from all mean views of pelf, that will alone prompt the invation of India, will no doubt induce the invaders to look to Providence for protection against similar mishaps, and they will do well; for without such aid, the snow-storms of the Hindoo-Kho, the rushing avalanches of Caubul, or the tornados of the Punjab, might furnish another instance of the wretched weakness of man, when sent forth unsheltered to face the elements in their wrath.

Besides, how are provisions to be got in the wilds? Plenty of beasts of burden for the carriage of all kinds of food and stores may, no doubt, be found in Tartary; but how is forage for the carriers to be found? And where is the narrow line of march that can support such a number? The mule, the most useful beast of burden, carries only 300 lbs. weight, and requires at least 15 lbs. of food daily, so that it can, in fact, carry only twenty day's provender for its own consumption. On green forage no continued work can be done; and even that is to be found only in verdant districts, immediately after the rains, or by diverging to a dangerous distance from the road. How then is this difficulty to be got over? To depend for supplies on countries thinly inhabited by nomade tribes, would be precarious indeed; for, though the natives might not attempt any direct opposition, they would be pretty sure to act the part of retreating enemies, and remove all their goods and chattles beyond the reach of the invaders. Even the best-behaved armies seldom find friends in the countries they traverse, because they naturally inspire fear. When it is discovered that they do no harm, and that they pay in hard cash, then indeed people will be as ready to cheat as they were before to plunder them; but this is an understanding that it requires time to arrive at. In Central Asia it has never been heard or dreamt of; there, plunder is the general vocation; and being besides the cheapest mode of making the most of the passing strangers, it will, no doubt, be the one resorted to. Acts of violence and retaliation follow as a matter of course, so that the long line of march becomes, in the end, but one continued skirmish; not in itself dangerous to the practised soldier, but ruinous from circumstances. In European warfare, the power of requisition, the orders of Government, or the hopes of gain, bring down supplies from the countries adjoining the line of operations, and the number of roads permit armies to march in several columns; but, in central Asia, all this is out of the question. A few caravan-tracts the are only roads, and the advance of an army drives everything before it, in a country where the little that exists is easily removed.

That there may be some fine and fertile valleys enclosed between the Hindoo-Kho and the Indus, is probable; but ample allowance must be made, nevertheless, for the glowing imagination of the Oriental writers who have described them, as well as for the Europeans whose accounts seem to corroborate such testimony. It must be recollected, that anything like a verdant country will make a pleasant impression on a wearied caravan-traveller, just in proportion to the wild and barren scenes he may before have passed through: only there is a wide difference between what such a traveller will call a fertile country, and what will be so considered by the person who looks at it with a view to its supporting an army. Economists would say truly, that where there is no demand there will be no supply! and in inland districts, inhabited mostly by moving tribes, destitute of roads and navigable rivers, as are the countries between the Indus and the Oxus, carrying on little or no trade, and least of all such bulky articles as the necessaries of life, no supply of provisions equal to the demand of a large army will ever be found; as there is no rational ground on which the rearing and storing of great, and in ordinary times, a useless quantity of food could possibly be accounted for. The ancient Germans, according to Tacitus, weighed all their plans after fasting as well as after feasting,—a judicious mode of proceeding, that we strongly recommend to the projectors of an over-land invasion of India. It will impress upon their feelings the importance of this part of the subject; for, let the finest army that ever took the field be but six days without food, and it will on the seventh be glad to exchange all the "pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war," for a mess of pottage,

To give the non-military reader an idea of the endless, and, unfortunately also, indispensable *attirail* of modern armies, is totally impossible; but Manstien mentions in his Memoirs, that in the campaign of 1770, the Russian armies in Moldavia had from 70,000 to 90,000 waggons in their train, and were yet in want of everything! nor is the improvement that may since then have taken place likely to be in proportion to the increased distance and difficulties that would attend a march to India. To take, for instance, ammunition alone, the least bulky, but most indispensable article required for a compaign, and the want of which, for a single hour, might prove decisive of the fate of an army. Every soldier carries sixty rounds of ball-cartridge, weighing, at twelve cartridges to the pound; so that a single additional supply for 69,000 men would require 1000 beasts of burden for its conveyance; and how soon soldiers fire away their ammunition, independently of the damage to which it is liable, may be judged from the fact, that the French actually fired away three millions of ball-cartridges during their few days operations before Algiers. Further, during the Spanish seiges, every British 24-pounder fired about 800 rounds per day, (a thing never before equalled,) making, at 32 pounds per round, powder and shot, a daily expenditure of 9,600 weight per gun. St. Sebastian, which was at last taken only after one of the most desperate assaults recorded in history, was battered at this rate for nine days with 20 guns, so that the expenditure, in heavy ordnance-ammunition alone, must have amounted to 1,728,000 weight, that, if carried overland, would have required 5769 beast of burden for its conveyance. As India has many St. Sebastians, defended too by those who have mounted some breaches, and who, as yet, have fled from none,—how many mule-loads of ammunition might it be advisable for the invaders to take with them on their expedition? That they will have no 24-pounders in their train may be granted; but to obtain the same result with guns of a less calibre, requires not only more time, but more ammunition also. We are, in truth, allowing artillery to pass in courtesy only, for no heavy gun-carriages could stand such a march, even with the cumbrous means of repair that the artillery carry along with them.

That, independently of food, clothing, and medicines, ammunition is not the only requisite in modern warfare, may be seen in Colonel Jones's very excellent account of the Spanish siege. It is there shown, that the first siege of Badajoz actually failed and that all the sieges were greatly impeded, for want of engineers' tools, which, owing to the deficiency of conveyance, could not be brought up in adequate numbers. The same want of conveyance occasioned the unfortunate siege of Burgos to be carried on without any battering-train whatever. Does not this strange fact seem almost conclusive of the question? For, if the British army and the Portuguese government together could not find the means of bringing a proper supply of engineers' tools, in addition to other implements of war, over good roads to Badajoz, and a few battering-guns to Burgos, where will the means be found capable of bringing them all the way across the high and trackless *steppes* of central Asia, from the Caspian to the Indus?

As facts are said to be as good as arguments, we here beg to add another of same kind. The Duke of Wellington, in his letter to the Marquis of Wellesley, dated 30th October, 1809, says, that "Owing to the bad forage, and to the want of regular supplies, the army lost 1500 horses in five weeks, exclusive of those lost in battle," making something more, perhaps, than a quarter of their whole number. This was during the Talavera campaign, in the best season of the year, and in the valley of the Tagus, the finest part of Spain, not perhaps inferior to Cabul; so that, supposing the invaders of India to meet with no worse weather, climate, or country on their march, and to suffer only in the same proportion, they would yet be totally destitute of cavalry and artillery, long before reaching the Indus.

How then, it may be asked, did Alexander, Nadir Shah, and others, reach India? It is easily shown; and as Colonel Evans lays same stress on the long marches of the Macedonian conqueror in Persia, and as Mr. Buckingham, whose local knowledge entitles his opinion to respect, advocates the possibility of an invasion of India through that country, we must here go a little out of our way to say a few words on both subjects.

Alexander's army was an ancient and a Macedonian army, and differed as much from a modern one as the present state of Persia differs from the ancient. A rich, civilized, and cultivated country could easily supply provisions for a Macedonian army, and that was nearly all that such an army required; but endless ruins, scattered in the midst of barren deserts, alone mark the spots where Suza, Babylon, and Persepolis stood. Where thousands lived in luxurious abundance, the curious traveller can now barely find food for himself and his followers; the country is totally changed; the means of supporting armies have vanished, while the wants of armed bodies have increased in a tenfold degree. A little corn, ground between two stones, sufficed for the Macedonian soldier; and, armed with his shield and sarissa, he was independent of the endless *matériel* that render modern armies so slow and unwieldy; whilst the positive nature of ancient tactics easily dispensed with a large proportion of officers, whose horses, baggage, and attendants of every kind, now so much increase the followers of armies. Skilful in the use of arms, and knowing his exact place in the ranks, the ancient soldier knew, individually, almost every thing that he could, under any circumstances, be called upon to perform. The close and deep formation of the phalanx confined the movements of entire armies to less ground than a modern brigade would occupy; their battles, fought mostly by day, and on level ground, enabled the chief not only to overlook the entire body, but his voice could give the necessary orders, and the pointing of a standard indicated the direction of a movement.

But these things are sadly changed now. Owing to the effects of artillery, extended formations have become necessary. Modern battles spread over miles of ground, so that, independently of the clouds of smoke, a very small portion of the combatants can be within sight, and still fewer within the hearing of the commander; he must therefore depend on reports brought from a distance, and send his orders in the same manner, which alone renders a numerous staff necessary to all who command, from a battalion to an army. To perform, with the automatons to which modern tactics have reduced the private soldiers, complicated movements under the fire of artillery, that from a distance sweeps entire sections away, to take up exact formations with such men, under a shower of musket-balls, when both friends and foes are enveloped by clouds of smoke, and nothing is heard but the incessant noise of fire-arms, great and small, requires not only a large proportion of officers, but an unbroken chain of communication from the general in chief down to the youngest leader of a subdivision, far more complicated than any thing the ancients ever dreamed of in performing their simple and straightforward movements. Then organize, it has been said, a modern army on the system of the ancients. But the materials are no longer extent. In the ancient world—in Greece and Rome, at least—and freemen were, from infantry, trained bodily and mentally to the profession of arms; it was the universal vocation, so that military ideas, habits, and knowledge, "grew with their growth, and strengthened with their strength." The Macedonians, in particular, of whom we are speaking, were, according to Arrian, a nation of shepperds, constantly obliged to defend their flocks sword in hand, and whose institutions were all of a military nature. Such men, trained from early youth to athletic exercises, were capable of undergoing privations and performing marches not to be expected from modern armies. For instance, when Alexander went to attack Spitamenes, then besieging the citadel of Maracanda, he marched 1500 stadia in three days, which at the lowest estimate assigned by Major Rennell for the itinerary stadium of Arrian, gives in round numbers, a rate of forty-five miles a day,—a distance that few men in the ranks of modern armies could go at any time, and still fewer with their heavy load of baggage and appointments.

But, though the expedition of Alexander cannot serve as a precedent in modern times, the loss he sustained in his Indian campaign may serve as a warning. What the exact amount was we no not know; but it was sufficient to terrify his followers,—men who had given ample proof that they were not easily daunted, but who now forced their reluctant monarch to return back from the banks of the Hyphasis, one of the tributaries of the Indus, before he had fairly entered, much less conquered, India. But had he marched triumphantly even to Cape Comorin, it would prove nothing in the present question. The Macedonian army, far superior to the mercenaries of Hannibal, traversed without difficulty the whole of Asia Minor, where, fourteen centuries afterwards, hundreds of thousands of crusaders perished from want and fatigue in the comparatively short march from Galliopolis to Antioch; and the 40,000 French who landed in Egypt under Napoleon could not even extend their conquests to the walls of Acre. There having been giants on the earth is no reason why pigmies should fancy themselves capable of bestriding the majestic world.

Let us now see how far the expedition of Nadir Shah bears on the subject. That conqueror, who was a native of one of the mountainous districts bordering upon India, invaded that country in 1739, at the head of some 60,000 of his followers,—men who had before raised him to the throne of Persia, and who knew well the ground they had to go over. A horde of Eastern warriors, mostly mounted, easily traverse large tracts of country. Even as far back at the time of the Romans, they were famous for such marches; and Tacitus, in the eleventh book of the Annals, states that Bardanes marched three thousand stadia in two days—"biduo tria millia stadiorum invadit;" and many other marches are recorded which no Europeans could possibly perform in that climate. Such armies have neither stores, baggage, nor ammunition to look after. The general rendezvous and object of the march are known, and each man finds his way onward in the best manner he can: if provisions and forage are not found at one place, it is only riding some ten or twenty miles farther. If a tract of desert is known to intervene, they take a few day's food with them on their horses, and force a march across at a rate that no European could dream of, and, rest and recruit themselves when they get to a fertile district. Those who can thus eat and plunder their way through, join at the trysting place, and dash onward; those who cannot, are never inquired after. If the first onset succeeds, well and good; if not, it is "*sauve qui peut.*" But as to systematic operations, are never thought of.

In this way Nadir Shah took Delhi with little opposition from the weak and timid soldiers of the Mogul; called himself conqueror of India, into which he had hardly penetrated; and returned loaded with spoil, the real object of the expedition. Such predatory invasions, undertaken against practised and warlike enemies can never end in any thing but discomfiture and disgrace. An enemy of this kind could not now capture the most ordinary village or hamlet—could not even approach a cane-field or rice-ground; and the passage of a jungle or a forest would be certain destruction—the very fate that the Pindarees, the exact representatives of such armies, experienced a few years ago.

In the present state of the science of war* no army, be its numbers ever so great, can bring any offensive operation of magnitude to a successful termination, if destitute of any of the three branches constituting the strength of armies. The absence of artillery, for instance, the most cumbrous of all, renders an ordinary field-work our well-stockaded post unassailable unless with a loss that the army of Xerxes could not long support: for notwithstanding the number of posts and redoubts carried by the bayonet during the late war, it may be safely asserted that a well-stockaded field redoubt, defended by British infantry, would be nearly impregnable to infantry only. What, indeed, are the assailants to do on arriving at the ditch of such a work, from behind the parapet of which two rows of infantry are coolly and in perfect security plying their muskets? To press on is useless, owing to the stockade; and to cut it down under the fire of men who do their duty, is in truth no easy matter—there seems nothing left for it but to fill the ditch and top stockade with the slain, or to go to the right about; and the latter alternative would probably be the one chosen.

We are of course, speaking of off-handed attacks only. With preparation, more may no doubt be effected against mere redoubts; but we all recollect the convents of Salamanca,—that were not easily taken even with preparation, and the aid of artillery to boot; and India will not be found destitute of temples, pagodas, and buildings of strength. British infantry, whose strength is, or should be, in the attack, were seldom called upon, during the late war, to defend works or posts; but they showed at the very last what they were capable of in this way. The night of the sortie from Bayonne, Captain Forster, of the 88th regiment, maintained with his company a house, the lower part of which the enemy were actually in possession of; and the most desperate and often-repeated attacks of the French failed to drive Captain Bulkeley and a party of the Royals from the church of St. Etienne: "Defend the church of St. Etienne to the last!" were the dying words of General Hay; and amply executed was the order, sealed with the death of the gallant veteran. "Don't spare them, lads—there's plenty of room for more in the church-yard!" was Bulkeley's injunction to his men; and never was a church-yard better filled in so short a time.

How incapable European troops are of performing marches perfectly easy to Asiatics, has also been shown within these few years. Bundaloo, the Burmese general, marched his entire army the whole way, from Arracan to Rangoon: yet a small

* Far too small a number. Major Dirom says, that the cattle belonging to the confederate army before Seringapatam, and to the bringarries, ammounted to nearly half a million, besides several hundred elephants, and nine thousand camels. Yet the army was comparatively close to its depots. Multiply half the number of your cattle by the length of a horse or mule, and see what a result it gives.

* We do not mean the high state of the science of war, or it has plenty of weak points; but such as it is, it must be met with at least equal arms.

British force of only 2000 men was, next season, unable to reach even the banks of the Irawadi by the same tract, a distance of only 150 miles, about equal to what the Eastern cavalry of Bardanes performed in one day, and the army of Alexander in three. The Assam detachment, having but little farther to go, never effected its junction with Sir Archibald Campbell at all.

When the schoolmaster shall have traversed the plains of Tartary, when the great Chan shall have conned his Adam Smith and Ricardo, and when M'Adam shall have stretched his polypus arms across the Hindoo-Kho,—then, and not till then, we may seriously talk of an overland invasion of India. What its results may then be, it would of course, be idle to speculate upon, seeing that we do not know what may then be the relative situation of the different parties, but what would now be the result of an actual invasion of India, if an army could get there, may be pretty well made out by a reference to history and to those principles which generally influence human actions. And as we have already supposed the invaders safely arrived in Northern India, let us now see what would probably be their fate,

It has been said that such is the misgovernment of India,—meaning that so ill-governed are the many for the benefit of a few,—that a hostile army has only to show itself on the soil of Hindostan, to ensure a general rising in its favour. This assertion we venture to combat: the countryman may, after long sunshine, wish for a reviving shower, but he will not, on that account hail the rising of the tropical thundercloud that bears the wide wasting tornado in its bosom. The time of mere capricious tyranny has long since passed away, not only from our country, but from our colonies also; the press and public opinion, by rendering the government in some measure dependent on the support of the governed, have linked their interest so closely together, that the advantage of the former can only be forwarded by the prosperity of the latter: and, though it may not be given to all men to act up to the stations in which chance at times places them, yet low and grovelling indeed must be the mind that will not be excited by preferment to noble exertion. The badia grain alone are hardened by prosperity in all others, fortune and success will kindle to a flame the slightest spark of just and honourable feeling. But leaving virtue and noble ambition out of the question, as it appears they must never be conceded to rulers for time being, by what means can the private objects of the governors be so surely attained as by a wise and upright discharge of the duties intrusted to them? Who would be a slave for farthings when honour offered thousands. Errors and mistakes there may be, perhaps must be, in more earthly governments; but to suppose that where there is light to guide, and where the object is good, the balance of result will yet be evil is a monstrosity implying no less than the existence of some dark power capable of counteracting all the best efforts of human exertion. That the government of India must, at times, have fallen into error, is self-evident, for no general system of laws or regulations, however wise in theory, could possibly have been applicable to the government of the heterogeneous mass that so suddenly came under their sway; all that could be done was to remove the causes of evil as they became apparent; and the wonder only is, that a government of such mere expediency should already have performed such great things.

From the earliest time until its entire subjugation by the British, India appears to have been divided into sects, castes, tribes, and nations, the latter, as usual, more frequently at war with each other than at peace; so that there never was, in fact, one entire Indian nation or united Indian people, nor is there now any general bias or feeling in the country except what is arrayed on the side of the British; being the natural bias of all those individuals, of whatever sect they may be, who are doing well and prospering. There are, no doubt, many princes who have lost their power, and who would be glad of any change likely to restore them to their former consequence; there may also be a number of turbulent adventurers willing to join any enterprise holding out a prospect of fame and fortune; but they form no united class or nation, and are only so many isolated individuals, scattered over an immense country, without any connecting link capable of ensuring a simultaneous and combined mode of action;—so that, joining the invaders, if at all, in small detachments only, more in want of aid than capable of affording it, and infinitely more disposed to plunder under the protection of the strangers than to fight for them, they would embarrass more than they could possibly assist. The princes of Hindostan have lost the power of bringing their former subjects into the field; and the peaceful artisan or labourer will not leave his house and home at the mere beck of a despot who can no longer compel, and whose government never afforded the security and protection that are enjoyed, under the British. Religious toleration, in its fullest extent has ever been looked upon by the Hindoos as consisting, in some measure, civil liberty and national independence; and the Government that respects their prejudices, and grants them protection and perfect freedom in all lawful pursuits, will always be sure of their support; and all things considered, no great wonder either. The comparatively small number of Mahometans are, no doubt, of a more restless and turbulent disposition; but while they also enjoy personal freedom and religious toleration, it will be difficult to show on what principle they would abandon one Christian power granting such protection, to join the standard of strangers, (least of all that of Russia, to the followers of the Prophet the most hateful of all the Christain powers,) of whose future intention they could know nothing. Such conduct is not consistent with human nature, least of all with the cautious character of the Orientals, a truth that was strongly illustrated during the late Burmese war.

When the British army attacked Rangoon, it was expected that the people of Pegue, who had but lately been subdued by the Birmans, and had not been over well treated by them, would have joined us against, their conquerors and oppressors; and that the Siamese, who had also there full share of wrong to avenge and some fine provinces to reclaim, would have availed themselves of the same opportunity. From recent conquest, and from the capricious despotism of Asiatic governments, there was some plausible ground for entertaining such an expectation, and yet it was in neither instance realized; the people of Pegue remained quiet to a man, and the Siamese contented themselves with sending a complimentary letter to Sir Archibald Campbell, styling him the taker of towns indeed, but leaving him the undivided honour of making the capture himself.

...what rational principle are we then to suppose that the people of Hindostan would act differently, and rebel against the best government they or their fathers ever knew, merely to assist strangers of whom they could know nothing? It would be a far juster conclusion to say, that the sensitive prejudices of the Hindoos, and the stern bigotry of the Mahometans, would make them fly with horror from the brutality of Russian soldiers unacquainted with their habits and feelings, and rendered ferocious by the fatigues and privations of a long march, and by the disappointment of finding war and toil, instead of luxury and repose awaiting their arrival in the land of promise.

The British army was on two occasions sent to assist nations in throwing off the yoke of a foe really oppressive and justly hated by all ranks. Both in the Peninsula and Holland we were received with loud cheers:—"*Viva el Rey!*" was shouted in one, and "*Orange boven!*" in the other; nor did "Turk Gregory ever do such deeds in arms" as were to be achieved by our side; but as soon as the battle was to be fought, or difficulties to be overcome, we were in both countries left to our own resources. Colonel Napier's book has done justice to the value of the Spanish assistance; and in the short campaign of 1814, not a single Dutch soldier appeared in the field. The Roman yoke was not a light one, yet none of the allies fell off, even in favour of Hannibal, till after the battle of Cannae; and the wonder only is, that, after such a catastrophe, any remained faithful. History is full of instances that show how much rather men bear

"the ills they have,
Than fly to others that they know not of."

After the defeat of the Danes and the peace of Lubeck, in 1629, protestant Germany was left at the mercy of the emperor, and experienced "Such mercy as men show in civil wars;" the chronicles of the time being, in fact little more than records of the excesses committed by the lawless bands of Tilly and Wallenstein; yet when, in the following year Gustavus Adolphus landed in Pomerania at the head of a Swedish army, not a single man joined his standard. It was not till a year's success had given him firm footing, and till the *forced* alliance of the Saxons had enabled the combined armies to gain the decisive battle of Leipzig, that the protestant princes ventured to join their deliverer who, by the fortune of war, had become the stronger. When the invaders of India shall have gained such a victory they may expect to be joined by all the Hindoo tribes and nations who shall have wrongs to avenge equal to those the German protestants had to complain of, that is, who shall have seen their religion prescribed, their temples demolished before their eyes, their children torn from them to be educated in a different faith, and their possessions placed at the mercy of a lawless and ferocious soldiery.

Let us now see what prospect there is of the invaders gaining such a victory over the men of whom Foy says, "*Au jour de combat on retrouvera les soldats d'Alexandre,*" and the "stern combat of Talavera" may serve as a standard. Napier states the British force engaged at 20,000 men, feebly aided by 40,000 Spaniards; and the French he estimates at 50,000. Including the European regiments of the East India Company, and one or two battalions that, in case of emergency, could easily be brought from Ceylon, very nearly that number of British might even now be assembled in India, and could be assisted by sixty or even one hundred thousand Sepoys, far superior, both in bravery and discipline, to the Spaniards of Cuesta, who could not be depended upon for a single movement; but remained quit spectators of the action, The invaders of India will, therefore, have to effect more on the day of battle than what 50,000 French troops, in high order, and commanded by experienced officers, were able to achieve in Spain at the very gates by their magazines. Bearing in mind the losses sustained by the armies of Hannibal and of Napoleon in performing the much shorter marches before alluded to, and recollecting that the French were almost constantly victorious, when contending against the Russians,—quere, how many men of the latter nation will have to leave Bokhara in order to arrive in India strong enough to perform more than the 50,000 French were equal to?

We have mentioned a battle merely to show what its result might probably be; but we think that the East India government would manage ill, which in military matters they seldom do, except when the spirit of retrenchment gets amongst them, if, with their resources, knowledge of the country, long time for preparation, and above all, with the knowledge of the very spot where the invading army would have to *debouche*, they could not take such measures as to leave them no alternative but that of laying down their arms. Dirom, in his account of the campaign of 1791, says. "The followers of an army in India, on being counted at four times the number of the fighting men, will appear to be a moderate estimate, on considering the particular circumstances and customs of the country." Further, "There are no towns to be depended on for supplies; and an army in India not only carries with it most of its means of subsistence for several months, but also a variety of necessaries which are exposed daily in the bazaars like merchandise at a fair: a scene resembling more the emigration of a nation, guarded by its troops, than the march of an army fitted out merely with an intention to subdue an enemy." Allowing an invading army to be rich enough to attract such a multitude of people, whose object, of course, is only gain, how are they to be protected, where there is a mere line of march and no secure basis of operation, against the *guerre de chicane* that may, and no doubt would, be carried on against the invaders from every point of the compass? These attendants would naturally fly at the approach of danger, and what could the army do without them? Let not the European soldado fancy, that these followers of the camp are the mere ministers of eastern luxuries; they are, in fact, so many servants only, whose labours ensure for the soldier the means of obtaining rest and food after the fatigues of the field. In other countries, soldiers can, for the most part, take care of themselves; but under the burning sun of India, they can do little more than perform their military duties; and to enable them to support even these in a climate so enervating, the means of restoring and recruiting the rapidly exhausting strength of the human frame must be constantly at hand.

Without entering into details, that would be endless, it may be safely asserted, that owing to the rapid consumption of all military *matèrial*, from men to shoe-soles, no army can now carry on protracted operations when separated by distance, locality, or the enemy, from its depots and regular sources of supply: it resembles the bough torn from the tree, that retains for a time both strength and verdure, but begins to decline from the moment it ceases to receive from the root or stem its regular proportion of nourishing juice; or, to speak more professionally, it is like a ball forced from one of our own engines of destruction, that begins to sink soon after it leaves the cannon's mouth, and whose furious career is but a progressive declension, till, within a measured space, it falls to the ground and remains innoxious unless again sent forward by a fresh supply of impelling power. How, for instance, could an army, beyond the reach of regular supplies, have recovered from the situation to which, according to Dirom, Lord Cornwallis's victorious army was reduced after the opening of the campaign of 1791?

"The Mahratta armies," says that able officer, "having advanced to Seringapatam in May, 1791, later than the appointed period, their delay and other unfortunatd circumstances reduced Earl Cornwallis to the neeessity of destroying his battering-train, after having defeated Tippoo Sultan in a pitched battle on the 15th of that month, and obliged his Lordship to lead back his victorious army, &c. &c. "The tents and clothing were nearly worn out, the arrack as well as the rice was almost expended, and in this situation the assistance of the troops was necessary to carry back part of the intrenching tools, which it might be difficult to replace, and to drag the field-pieces and tumbrils attached to their corps, a task to which the surviving cattle were unequal in their weakly state. Great part of the horses of the cavalry were so reduced by want and fatigue, that they could no longer carry their riders, and many, unable to march, were now shot at their piquets. The ground at Caniambady, where the army had encamped but six days, was covered, in a circuit of several miles, with carcasses of cattle and horses; and the last of the gun carriages, carts, and stores of the battering-train left in flames was a melancholy spectacle, which the troops passed as they left this deadly camp."

Separated by 2000 miles of precarious road from its nearest depots, how could an army recover from such a situation in the face of practised enemies, having not only the resources of India at their command, but being perfectly within reach of whatever reinforcements or supplies Great Britain might be disposed to send them by a safe and uninterrupted mode of conveyance? In our own time an insolated, and, to a certain extent even unencumbered, army may make a successful dash, or *coup de main*, at a post, fort, position, or sugar island; but against a country like India, 1500 miles in length, and 1000 in breadth, covered with strong-holds, having three capitals, each capable of standing a regular siege, and no place of vital importance to its safety, such an enterprise is entirely out of the question.

Taken as a body, the officers, civil and military, of the East India Company's service have given evidence of the highest order of talent. Whether this arises from young men starting more fairly in India than in other countries, where rank and station are alone sure passports to success, or from being called upon, at an early period of life, to exert whatever energy of character they may possess, freed in a great measure from the trammels of form and precedent, we pretend not to say; but judging from what is known to all, the fact seems indisputable. During the late Pindaree and Maratta wars, subalterns and captains commanding detachments gave proofs of kill, promptitude and decision, that would have done honour to the highest rank; and while the Sepoys shall be commanded by such officers, they will be equal to any troops that can be brought *against* them in India; for, however inferior they may be to European veterans in some respects, they will only be called upon to fight under circumstances most favourable to their own qualities, and least favourable to those of the invaders, who must of course be prepared to fight under all circumstances. If, therefore, the civil and military officers do their duty as ably as they have hitherto done, a European army now entering India would be exposed not merely to the army in its immediate front, but to the whole power of India, that, like the waters of the ocean, would close around and press upon the invaders from every quarter. Their army would be encompassed by foes acquainted with the country, a safe retreat in every direction, and however few in number on particular points, everywhere strong enough to harass, to destroy straggiers, and to keep supplies at a distance; leaving the invaders free scope to move, indeed, for they would not move far, but leaving them nothing more than the wasted ground within the reach of their arms. And what proportion of space could the bravest and most numerous army arriving from Europe occupy on the immense peninsula of Hindostan? They would be made to pay for every defile, pass, or difficult piece of ground. If a post had to be defended, Hougomont should be the watchword,—if to be attacked, Badajoz and St. Sebastian should be the war-cry. The value of such splendid deeds of arms is not confined to the local advantages that result from them at the time; they serve as bright examples for future imitation, showing how much may be accomplished, where there is—

"The will to do, the soul to dare."

No invading army can bear up against such a system of warfare in any climate, least of all under the burning sun of India. Invaders, to be successful, must seize places of vital importance to a country, strike great and dazzling blows, to frighten the week, bring over the wavering, and capable of intimidating all but the master spirits whom the rocking of the world would not move from the bright path of honour and of fame. But in India, there are no places of vital importance to the safety of the whole country, nor can decisive blows be struck against a practised enemy, perfectly conscious of his strength, and who can safely delay to strike till he can strike with deadly and unerring aim; fully aware that time, by daily augmenting his force, and by diminishing that of the invaders, must in the end deliver them up bound hand and foot. Between two armies so situated there can, in fact, be no contest;—it is a false Don Quixote charging the wind-mills, not under the generous delusions that impelled the gallant knight of La Mancha, but blinded by the hope of filthy lucre,

To give to the entire undertaking a solid basis of operation, capable of securing it against the evils above mentioned, becomes of itself an enterprise of time, labour, and expense; and would require the military occupation of a line of country, (also secured in the rear) extending almost from the wall of China to the frontiers of Persia, and demanding at least from one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand men for its protection. Distant and unbased inroads into the territory of a strong and enlightened enemy are now worse than precarious, for their only chance of success rests on the weakness or ignorance of the invaded, a foundation too uncertain to be built upon in war. The successful inroads made by the French armies under Napoleon, only prove that his enemies were more ignorant of the true principles of the deadly game at which they were playing, than he was himself; and the first time he was resisted---the very first time his enemies refused to yield to his summons, his failure (from causes that admitted beforehand of as evident demonstration as the simplest proposition in Euclid) was so complete, that but for the hold his reputation has got upon the minds of men, his name, as a soldier, would be held up to scorn and derision.

To put this matter fairly at issue, in every point of view, let us suppose that the invaders of India commence that vast undertaking by the establishment of a proper basis of operation; for, with time, men, and money, there is, of course, nothing impossible. And let us then see what might be the result of the enterprise supposing Great Britain, as in duty bound, disposed to fight out the battle with British steel and British spirit, instead of yielding to the clamour that would, no doubt, be raised against any brave determination to retain our most valuable possession, and to uphold the honour of the country. Considering the distance, the difficulties of the roads the delays, that the constant want of supplies would occasion, it is not likely that Russia could obtain fair military possession of the countries bordering upon India, in less than four years from the time of our being made acquainted with the attempt; so that we should, of course, have the same space of time for preparation. Britain had, in 1814, besides 20,000 men in India, armies actually opposed to the enemy in Spain, Sicily, Holland, and Canada, and might, in far less than four years time, have an equal number again at her disposal. Of these, 40,000 or more might, if necessary, be transported to India by a sure mode of conveyance, making, when joined to those already in that country, 60,000 British, who, added to 120,000 natives, would give exactly three times the force that gained the battle of Talavera, against 50,000 tried and experienced French troops. So that allowing the Russians to be equal to the French, which they have never proved themselves to be, it would require more than 150,000 Russians to contend successfully against such an army; that is, Russia would have to bring a stronger army into India than she was able to bring into the field of Borodino for the defence of Moscow, when the fate of the empire was at stake; and four times the number of men she was able to carry across the Balkan to Andrianople. Where then is the prospect of our being over-matched on the plains of Hindostan? We are here putting an extreme case, that we never expect to see realized, merely to show the relative power of the parties if disposed to exert themselves to the utmost. But, if the battle is ever to be fought, let us at once throw away both the purse-strings and the scabbard,---make any sacrifice consistent with national honour and security, to avoid drawing the sword; but when once determined upon, away with all half measures, and, above all, with that penny wisdom which, in military matters, invariably leads to pound folly. Let any one attempt to calculate how many millions of treasure, and how many thousands of gallant lives might have been spared, had 25,000 such British soldiers as those who, in 1815, decided the fate of Europe on the plains of Waterloo, aided by the same allies who fought by our side, in 1793, taken the field at the outset of the contest, when the French troops were but a week and disorganized rabble, compared to the tried and victorious bands of later times! The mournful balanace of blood that must appear against the system then pursued should at least act as a warning against its repetition: that balance, the interest of which the nation is yet paying in tears and treasure, is surely long enough to convince the most incredulous, how little was gained by being without an army, without military pride, character and confidence,—and, above all, without that high and commanding military character, policy, and decision that is now almost synonymous with national independence.

We have endeavoured to show, that an army invading India would first have to perform a march which, judging from all we know at present, no European army could accomplish in an efficient state; that it would next have to pass a river, or succession of rivers, and a mountain-barrier, forming obstacles of such magnitude, that the chances would be any where against their successful execution; that it would then have to encounter, on their own ground and on their own terms, enemies, against whom the pages of history, if fairly viewed, record but one defeat, and not a single instance of deviation from honour or from duty, and would ultimately, in its isolated state, have to carry on war against any force Great Britain might be disposed to send out, or keep efficient in India. Without saying that any of these operations are impossible, we may venture to assert, that they are all, as individual operations, of sufficient difficulty to make even the boldest pause. Yet they have all to be performed in succession,—the successful performance of each lessening, in a fearful degree, the means of undertaking the next. Where then is the ground to hope that all can be successfully performed? But as "fools will rush where angels fear to tread," it is right to be prepared for every emergency.

I saying nothing of the expense that might attend an overland attack on India, we may be accused of omitting the most important part of the subject, since "'Tis gold, not steel, that rears the conqueror's arch." The truth is, that we have too few data on which to form a just estimate; but in 1809, the Duke of Wellington estimated the expenses of his army, which did not them exceed 20,000 men, at 200,000*l.* per month, (independent, of all the stores that came from England;) and as the actual pay formed but a small item of this sum, every one may judge of the expense of keeping armies in the field. Of the Russian finances, though generally understood to be in a flourishing condition, little is known, for the statement laid annually before a committee of noblemen and gentlemen at Petersburg proves nothing whatever, the parties present being only allowed to say "We have seen," and to make their bow. As to the expense of moving a Russian army, it must, like the movement of all other armies, depend in a great measure on circumstances and situation. And, though the pay of all ranks is very small, yet that pay doubles the moment they cross the Russian frontier.

To reason with those, who, like many worthy people on the Continent, fancy that an army has only to enter India, in order to be at once ankle deep in gold dust and pearls, is, of course, entirely out of the question: for, if there is any one thing more certain than another, it is that the invaders of India would not get one single rupee or pagoda till they were masters in the country; till then they would have to depend on their own roubles, that had better be in plenty, for everything in India, from the service of an army to a pound of rice, is estimated according to its value in gold, and tendered in exact proportion to the promptness of payment. If any part of the foregoing statement seems to insinuate that little will be got for money, it may be safely taken for granted that less will be got for love.

Independently of all commercial and pecuniary considerations, a great moral obligation imposes on Britain the defence of the institutions, and the numerous population that have sprung up under our dominion in India. As long as the millions who, under our government, have been born to an inheritance of peace and security shall be unable to govern and protect themselves, (and, from the nature of Indian character and manners, a long period must elapse before that time shall arrive,) they are as much entitled to our protection as the child in its years of weakness is entitled to the protection of its parents. The performance of this duty should now force upon the government of India, not only the occupation of Attock, but also of Caubul and Cashmere. Such a measure would bring peace to those distracted countries, and would give us strong and valuable possessions in advance of, and to the head of the Indus; whilst the first sight of that river and of the land of promise should present to the view of the invaders Attock, raised to the rank of a first-rate fortress, prepared to relieve them of some of the fiery valour, strength, and *matériel* that might still happen to encumber them after a thousand miles of march across the *steppes* and mountains already described.

If the citadel of Antwerp, a fortress of strength, but not of the first order, situated within five easy marches of Valenciennes, withstood 75,000 French and 180 pieces of artillery for thirty-two days, (dating from the investment,) and was then surrendered before even a single breach had been made practicable, how long might a first-rate fortress resist an army arriving from Russia, after a march of *two seasons*, and having to bring all its stores and artillery from the same distance! If Acre, on the coast of Syria, the ill-constructed works of which were half in ruins, resisted all the efforts of the French army of Egypt, on what grounds can we suppose that a Russian army could capture a first-rate fortress on the Indus?

Frederick II., in speaking of the war in America to Mitchell, the English ambassador, said—"*C'est une chose effrayante que d'être obligé de faire la guerre, même près de chez soi; mais si l'armée est au bout du monde, ah! Monsieur, croyez-en un vieux practicien, pourvoir cette armée de tout ce qu'il lui faut, c'est le chef-d'œuvre de la prudence humaine,*" In this respect we perfectly agree with his Majesty, and never expect to see human prudence displayed in an overland invasion of India.

Great and distant enterprises of this nature could only be contemplated when armies were composed of men formidable from their training, energy, and skill in the use of efficient arms, capable of performing great actions, without the aid of monster-mortars; at a time when genius, and not fortune, ruled the fate of battles; when noble deeds were nobly rewarded; when statues were raised to the memory of the brave who fell, and crowns of gold placed by universal acclamation on the brows of the surviving victors. But in our days no high military talent has presided over the organization of armies. Soldiers are trained only to the unskilful loading and firing of a clumsy musket, poverty and neglect forming the sole rewards of toils and wounds. Such men can merely make short incursions from their ships, or carry on war in neighbouring countries possessing roads fit for the conveyance of huge war-engines, and where requisitions and the *kantchu* can collect the necessary supplies. It is only after years of bloodshed, waste of treasure, when hunger and disease have caused more destruction than the sword, that results are effected by armies so composed;—they either frighten or exhaust an enemy; but they possess not the power of striking mighty blows, capable of levelling at once the most formidable adversaries, and of restoring peace to humanity and serenity to the political atmosphere, as the summer sky cleared and cooled by the bursting of the thunder-cloud and the passing away of the storm.

In the event of any future war b...

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tain and Russia, the *friendly* occupation of the Scandinavian peninsula on one side, and of Greece and Turkey on the other, would be the most likely means of attack resorted to against us. From the first, our shores might be threatened with invasion, our Baltic trade annihilated, and a passage, through Denmark, effected into Hanover. From the second, our Levant trade might be cut up, and our Mediterranean possessions harassed or assailed. In the true spirit of the age, that blinds itself to dangers while they are distant, and magnifies them when near, as an excuse for immediate submission, this will no doubt be termed a mere visionary scheme, incapable of ever being carried into effect in the face of the great powers of the Continent; but unfortunately for the value of such reasoning, there are some of us old enough to recollect the unresisted occupation of Holland, Hanover, Italy, and Portugal, by Napoleon, when he was incomparably weaker than what a Russian Emperor is now, and when the same language was held without being followed up by a single word of efficient remonstrance from any one of the great powers in question.

"As coming events cast their shadows before," there is much that seems to indicate the approaching dissolution of the East India Company's government. Though we have, for the present, nothing to do with such speculations, we cannot conclude this article without offering our tribute of admiration to the great things they have performed in their day. Their power and dominion augmented with a rapidity that far exceeded the rise and progress of Rome itself, because, unlike the destroyed of Carthage, Corinth, and Numantia, they made victory every where subservient to the cause of mercy and humanity. Whether they have effected all the good that lay in their power, it is impossible to say; but they substituted safety for violence, anarchy and bloodshed. Their rule conferred, on a hundred millions of people, the blessings of peace, and brought with it that protection for persons and property never before known in India: and where is the government recorded in the annals of mankind, that, in so short a period of time, contributed so much towards the happiness and prosperity of the nations placed under its sway?

J. M.

JOURNALS OF EXPEDITIONS IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA.

The very various and contradictory accounts which have been given to the public from time to time of the condition and prospects of the colony at Swan River, and other points of Western Australia, render this little work very acceptable. It consists of reports made by a number of officers despatched with parties on different routes; whose observations and remarks are put down in a manner in which at least it is very evident there is no intention to delude. By the aid of the copious and extensive map which accompanies the volumes, and the various routes of which we have the journals, the tracks being distinguished in the chart, a very tolerable idea may be formed of this huge cantle of a continent, the South-western part of Australia. The report, as well as it may be collected, is favourable, but by no means uniform. The country has a vast number of recommendations for pastoral settlement more particularly; rich land constantly occurs, separated and divided now and then by barren districts, which are compared to some of our commons; at others, by stony and sandy tracts; in the majority of instances, however, the land is rich though not like the rich earths of this country, inasmuch as its appearance is often sandy or white-coloured—properties or appearances which do not interfere with its fertility. The forest-trees are abundant and magnificent; scattered, too, in the park-like manner which has been so often mentioned in describing the Eastern shores of Australia. Water—and this is a grand distinction between Western and Eastern Australia—is abundant. Unhappily, it flows in no grand stream; but it is found gently descending in innumerable water-courses, which frequently proceed at the distance from each other of only a few hundred yards. Water may be had almost any where with a little digging, and that often with the hands only. The climate is healthy in the most remarkable degree: in this respect the country is unrivalled: the temperature, however, will be found somewhat too hot for those who love the varieties of our own capricious climate.

The colony perhaps will not be one of a very rapid growth: but it has many advantages. To plant a thoroughly new country, is a very delicate and dangerous experiment; and it is surprising that the first step has been made at Swan River with so much firmness. The individual loss and suffering has been considerable: it must, however, have been greater anywhere else. The land about the coast, has not been found to answer all the expectations entertained of it; but this will not continue to be a complaint long. It will soon be abundantly supplied from the interior. The coast, now that it is better known, is no longer dreaded; and some fine harbours have been, if not exactly discovered, at least made better known. The colonists are beginning to feel the want of labourers, and to cry out for convicts and Government assistance; aad we hear nothing of the Chinese and other Orientals, which the *Quarterly Review* promised in such abundance. The time may not have come for this. There seems no reason, *if* the colonists can pay them, why they should not soon have aid from that quarter.

Stock of all kinds appears to thrive uncommonly well in Western Australia. The value of land is rising fast. Commodities of all sorts are becoming tolerably plentiful. The water produces abundance of fish, and the woods plenty of game, such as it is: kangaroo, we should imagine, when properly treated, and killed at proper seasons, will turn out as good as venison; but cockatoo, we fear, is not so well flavoured as either grouse or partridge. The lover of the picturesque, if any such ever emigrates, will not find himself disappointed. For instance, scenes of the following description are not rare. The observer is Mr. Bussel, who has made several exploratory expeditions.

"The country, as we advanced on the other side of the rivulet, improved rapidly; the ground on which we trod was a vivid green, unsullied with burnt sticks or blackened grass trees; not that it was covered with a decided turf, but the vegetation seemed more succulent than woody, and the plants growing to about the same height, presented to the eye a smooth surface,

"With daisies pied, and violets blue.
And [illegible] smocks all silver white."

Though the flowers were not perhaps precisely the same that characterize an English meadow they were not the less beautiful in appearance, varied in form, or brilliant in colour; grass was plentiful, and the clover I have noted above, with its bright scarlet and yellow flower, the daisy, buttercup, and a purple marigold. The whole effect reminded me of that confusion of rich tints that are produced in the Indian loom, and as I looked upon it, I could not feel but inclined to believe that such a scene as this must have presented to the imagination of the Hindoo, the high colouring of his fabrick, and the protoype of the gaudy chints.

Half a mile brought us on to a small river, and so slow that I could hardly ascertain the existence of a current. I concluded it to be, as it afterwards proved to be, the Vasse. The sound of rushing water proclaimed a rapid near; walking, therefore, a short distance up the stream, we found what we sought, a passage over.

Here was the spot that the creative fancy of a Greek would have peopled with dryad and naiad, and all the beautiful phantoms and wild imagery of his sylvan mythology: wide waving lawns were sloping down to the water's edge, trees thick and entangled were sloping over the banks. One in the centre of the rapids had taken root in the very rocks over which the water tumbled: its bended trunks and tortuous roots seemed to indicate that it had struggled more than once to gain the perpendicular form from which it had been thrust by the rude torrents which at certain periods evidently pour down this obstruction to the free flow of the river.

About a hundred or two hundred yards on the other side, we obtained a sight of the sea bearing N. W. The country here was so clear that a farmer could hardly grudge the fine speading trees of the red and white gum and peppermint the small portion of ground that they occupied only to ornament. The soil was always good, sometimes very light; a red sandy loam; at other times stiff, particularly where the white gum prevailed.

After walking about three miles in a N. by W. direction along the banks, we began to observe evident tokens of the proximity of the sea, such as hottentot-figs, rock-spinach; of the latter we prepared a mess when we arrived on the edge of a large flat, into which the river falls. It was then twelve o'clock; before, however, we began our repast, we were hailed by three natives, who were wading over from the opposite side, fearful, probably, that we were likely to interfere with some snares for fish which they had constructed near the spot where we were; they carried spears, but approached withal with such friendly guise and courtly seeming, that I did not hesitate to advance to meet them alone and unarmed. They were, on the whole, smaller of stature than the men I had been accustomed to see, and wore no skins. The countenances of two of them were certainly ugly and brutal enough, but the third had a sprightly air and good-humoured expression, accompanied with that revolting laugh which is so general with these savages: his hair matted with peculiar taste into strings, resembling spun yarn, and bound up close, displayed a head of true Caucasian proportion, with a facial angle less acute than is often observable in the European.

They expressed considerable surprise at the facility with which we procured a spark from the firelook; and, upon our making signs to that effect, soon blew it into a blaze. I afterwards shot them two small birds, and gave them some of our kangaroo meat, which they ate, refusing biscuit aad vegetables. I obtained some words of their language; it seemed much the same as that used at Augusta. As is the custom there, they designated one another, as well as ourselves (in compliment, I have always thought), with the appellation youngaree and mamiungo; this struck me as a considerable evidence of connexion existing between them and the savages of Cape Leeuwin. The words—

Mendenah	Eyebrow.
Yelit	Eye.
Nolt	Tooth.
Donga	Ear.
Daan	Foot.
Koat	Hair.

We have included the latter part of the extract to introduce some mention of the natives, who have been represented in formidable colours. In these journals, we find numerous entries of the meeting of natives (they are, however, very thinly scattered), and the report of them is invariably favourable: they are good humoured, friendly, intelligent, but certainly not handsome: many of them had not seen Europeans, and were all the better-behaved on that account. In fact, it would seem, that until they reside for some time in the neighbourhood of our civilized countrymen, nothing can be better-disposed than they are. What, for instance, can have more of human sympathy and good disposition of heart—the basis of all civilization—then the apprehension of these untutored savages, when they beheld some of the exploring strangers about to eat food which would injure them?

The grass tree is not uncommon, but of a different species from either the many-crested or hastile; its trunk does not appear above ground, but the stalk that bears the flower and seed is much slenderer than ordinary; very light and straight. In the hand of an African it would no doubt have become an arrow; to the Australian savage it is of little use, except to round his fish-snares; it did not appear to yield the yellow gum, or rather resin. Wild celery grew very abundant on the side of the estuary. The natives make, however, a great point of our eating it; signifying it would affect us with vomiting; some of these people had once before done the same thing, on my affecting to taste the nuts of the palm-tree, which I knew to be emetic; as they, therefore, seemed to view unconcerned our dish of rock spinach, I was inclined to pay some regard to their exhortation.

The following little discovery looks like a trace of worship among these people, which we have not observed in the remarks of previous settlers.

In the neighbourhood of our bivouac, and for some distance around, were large masses of granite; in one of these we discovered a cavern, the interior being arched, and resembling somewhat in appearance an ancient ruin. On one side was rudely carved what was evidently intended to represent an image of the sun, it being a circular figure about eighteen inches in diameter, emitting rays from its left side, and having, without the circle, lines meeting each other nearly at right angles: close to this representation of the sun, were the impression of an arm and several hands.

The extract which follows is taken from the account of the most adventurous and remarkable of the whole of these expeditions. It is Captain BANNISTER'S journey across the interior of the great South-western corner of Australia, from Swan River to King George's Sound. The extract is a very fair average view of the whole of the country he met with in the interior. What he says of his entertainment, as he approached the coast, will show that exploring, even in this fine country, is not without its hardships.

The forest trees are the mahogany and the red and white gum. On the higher hills and on the poor lands the former predominated; on the lower lands and sides of the hills, where good land was, the latter: there were the usual trees, such as the banksia, tea-tree, &c., in this tract. As for underwood, there was a great quantity in some places. From the double-peaked mountain to the coast, is only about thirty miles. We made first seventeen miles to the S. W. ½ W., then sixteen or eighteen miles to the south. To attempt to say any thing of the soil for a considerable distance, except that which we actually trod upon, and the open valleys and the swamps, would be absurd: the underwood was so thick that it was, in many places, with the greatest difficulty that we could get on, and occasionally we were obliged to make a road with our hatchet. The trees were principally the blue gum; and if others had not seen them, I should be afraid to speak of their magnitude. I measured one, it was, breast high, forty-two feet in circumference; in height, before a branch, 140 to 150 we thought at least, and as straight as the barrel of a gun; from the immense growth of these trees, I formed an opinion that the land upon which they grew could not be bad; what little we did see was a brown loam, capable of any cultivation, and where underwood was not remarkably thick, grass and herbage grew luxuriantly: such was the character of the country generally, as far as we could see. At a distance, you would suppose that the country was very undulating, and broken in places; but the height of the woods gives it a much higher appearance than it really has, and being intersected with swamps and valleys, with very few trees on them, and those of stunted banksia or tea-tree, they have the full advantage of their height. In these valleys there is a vast quantity of feed for stock, but not sheep, coarse grass herbage, and brush they are dry enough in summer to pass over, some of them are several miles in length, and one or two broad. Within five miles of the sea, you come to sand hills, which are as difficult to pass over as the woods for the horses, being extremely broken; those over which we passed were well calculated for sheep, being covered with an abundance of grass, a pea, thorn, and the peppermit. We had now been absent from Fremantle thirty-three days: we had halted, on account of our horses, six days, and had made, on some days, very little head-way, on one occasion only three miles. We reached the coast, therefore, in twenty-seven days' travelling; had we not turned off on the 5th of January, I have not doubt but that we should have reached our destination in twenty-eight days, including our six days' halt, since we should soon have entered upon the country described by Dr. Wilson; and we should have escaped a most difficult march to the coast, and also the disasters and sufferings to which we were exposed while on the coast for nineteen days without provisions, and for several days before we reached it. But then, if I may be permitted to remark it, if this colony prospers,—and from the body of good land in the interior, of the existence of which I have no doubt,—a certain good will arise from our disasters, since I am tolerably certain it would not have been traversed for years to come; and, consequently, the fact of there being good land, even among these hills, would not have been known to exist. I shall not trouble his Excellency with a long detail of our sufferings: I shall merely state, that we were on the coast for nineteen days, depending entirely upon shell-fish for subsistence; sometimes, where we found them and the surf was not too great, we fared pretty well.

There is an appendix of the latest intelligence from the colony; consisting of letters and reports, some of which are very interesting. The climate, all agree, is unrivalled. Dr. Milligan says—

I have met with several individuals here, who, on leaving England, were great sufferers from dyspepsia, and disorders of the digestive organs generally, from the nervous affections which so often accompany these—from hypochondria, from asthma, and from bronchial diseases—who have recovered their health in a remarkable degree since their arrival. Some of slight figures have become more robust and stronger. Parturition with the female sex is expeditious and safe, being accomplished by the efforts of nature alone within from three to six hours. No woman has died in child-birth in this colony since its commencement, nor am I aware of any who died within a month after.

This is good news, in a colony where no fear of Malthus will prevail for many ages. Dr. Milligan's report is still further confirmed by the remarkable testimony of Dr. Johnson to the health of sailors under his care.

For the benefit of farmers and agricultural capitalists, who may be thinking of exchanging their position from one of our shires to its antipode, we must quote one of the letters of fact, each of which may be looked upon as detailing fair experiments.

In compliance with your wish, I here send you a short statement of my proceedings and remarks since my arrival at Swan River. If you think them worthy of notice, or useful in any shape, they are at your service.

February 3d, 1830. Arrived at Swan River, in the brig Tranby, from Hull, and found many of the emigrants in their tents at Fremantle, generally dissatisfied, and full of complaints respecting the colony, and some of them ready for going away. The flats up the Swan, the badness of the soil, the heat of the weather, with many other things of the same kind, appeared to be the subjects of general conversation when worshipping at the shrine of Bacchus; and after being assailed on every hand by such miserable comforters, I found it necessary to leave them and go to look for myself; and after reaching the Peninsula (where I now reside), was convinced that the land was of an useful character, and might be made to suit the general purposes of agriculture, although inferior to much of the land higher up the Swan. The first three or four months were taken up by house and boat-building, getting up the goods from Fremantle to the Peninsula, &c, &c. In June we began to clear the land and plough for wheat, barley, oats, rye, &c., all of which came up well; but the fences not being sufficiently good, the cattle broke in and destroyed a great part of the crop; that which escaped their ravages came to maturity, and was of a very good description. The last year 1831, has convinced me that when the land can have tillage and proper management, it will grow wheat, barley, oats, rye, potatoes, and turnips, in great abundance: very good specimens of the aforesaid articles were produced the last year—the average weight of wheat from sixty-two to sixty five pounds per bushel. As it respects the seed time, it is as long and favourable as we can wish; it commences the latter part of May, and continues through June, July, and even August, where the land is in good condition. We have heavy rain in September, very fine showers in October and November, and in the beginning of December the corn is ready for reaping, so that it suffers nothing for the want of moisture. We have little or no more rain until March (although very heavy dews), when the showers commence, and increase every month until July or August, after which they gradually subside until November, December, January, and February, the weather in general is hot, and the grass much burnt up—but the cattle do well and keep their condition the year round; when the grass fails they feed on the grass tree and the tops of the brush-wood. Young stock thrive remarkably well, and are as large when nine months old as the same description of stock would be in England at twelve months. I think this is owing to the very fine climate, which permits them to graze throughout the year, without being obliged to house them for six months out of twelve, and keep them on dry fodder (as is the case in England), which very materially hinders their growth. Sheep do well and increase very fast; in some instances twice in the year. The great scarcity of working cattle, has very materially retarded the progress of the settlers in their agricultural pursuits, and has prevented the colony from arriving at that state of improvement and prosperity which it otherwise would have done. When a sufficient quantity of bullocks and sheep can be obtained to satisfy the wants of the settlers, and a portion of those settlers can be established on the Avon River, as graziers, the colony will be in a fair way for supplying itself with all the necessaries of life, produced on its own soil. What I have seen of Yorkshire, on the river Avon, I was much pleased with, and think it well adapted for either grazing or farming; but the distance from market, in the present state of the colony, will prevent much being done in the farming line above what is wanted on the spot for consumption. As it respects the colony at large, there is little doubt but it will succeed, *and well*; if it receive that encouragement and support which all colonies need in their infancy. We have already seen the wilderness become a fruitful field, bending beneath the gentle breeze, and are looking forward to the time when every diligent man shall be surrounded with peace and plenty.—*Spectator, June* 22.

It is with extreme regret we state that Prince George of Cumberland, who completed his 14th year on Monday last, has, within a very short period, been wholly deprived of sight: this melancholy circumstance will account for his Royal Highness not having been in public of late, or participated in the grand entertainments given by their Majesties.—*Windsor Express, June* 1.

A correspondent at New Orleans informs us that in Virginia free labour has lately become cheaper than slave labour; and that in consequence the question of emancipating the slaves has been spoken of as likely to be brought forward, and, of course, carried. The States of Maryland and Delaware are at present the only States strongly opposed to emancipation; but slaves there are gradually falling in value, and there is no doubt that in the course of a year or two free labour will also be cheaper there.—*Globe.*

BOMBAY.—Printed and published for the PROPR[illegible] by SORABJEE DORABJEE, at the Courier-Press, [illegible] Church-lane, where all communications addressed to the EDITOR, are received.